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Executive summary 
This report critically examines the modalities of development cooperation and experiences of 
China and United Kingdom‘s (UK) engagements in Kenya and Sri Lanka. Given the 
increasing importance of China and the UK in development cooperation and assistance, and 
the new approaches that they bring to such cooperation, understanding the modalities of 
their engagement may provide useful insights into how partnerships may be cultivated and 
deepened to realise the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This report explores the idea of partnerships and, through two country case studies, 
explores the nature, function and rationale for interaction engagement by China and the UK 
in Kenya and Sri Lanka. It maps the current national priorities of Sri Lanka and Kenya and 
their ongoing cooperation with the UK and China. It identifies areas in which cooperation can 
be deepened, as well as the convergences between national priorities and UK and/or 
Chinese expertise. For both cases, it also examines current trilateral initiatives with which 
both countries are involved. It highlights country-specific experiences, and found that for 
Kenya, trilateral cooperation is concentrated in a few specific areas and will need 
diversification to better support its national development goals. Moreover, the agenda of 
trilateral cooperation in Kenya depended largely on who participated in the project. While Sri 
Lanka has had comparatively little experience in trilateral cooperation, past experiences 
have demonstrated that national politics play a pivotal role in determining the strength of 
political will (or lack thereof) and the agenda of development cooperation with other 
countries. 
 
The following findings emerge from the cases which are important for the 
implementation and realisation of the SDGs through partnerships: 
 
1. National interests are important drivers for engagement in partnerships; 
 
2. Multilateral and bilateral partnerships should be mutually supportive, and 
the best form of partnership must be assessed on a case-by-case basis; 
 
3. It is important that all actors, at all levels (local, national, regional, global), 
are able to exercise agency in partnerships; 
 
4. Partnerships should addressing skill shortages and providing 
technical support; and 
 
5. Institutions should be formed to build and manage partnerships. 
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1 Introduction 
Dynamic global political and economic processes reshape development cooperation, trade 
and investment relationships. South-South collaboration and triangular cooperation with 
developed and developing countries change the economic landscape with the potential to 
achieve sustainable development outcomes. As the second and fifth largest economies in 
the world with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$13.4 trillion and US$2.83 trillion 
respectively, China and the UK are undoubtedly major actors in international development 
cooperation (World Population Review 2020). Both countries have strategic interests in 
infrastructure building and commitments toward the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 
(HM Government 2019; Renwick et al. 2018). Kenya and Sri Lanka are two important cases 
in the development cooperation between China and the UK: Kenya is the fastest growing 
economy in East Africa (World Bank 2019a: np); and Sri Lanka is geo-strategically located at 
the centre of the Indian Ocean and has extensive historical ties with the UK and China. 
Kenya’s and Sri Lanka’s geographical location by the sea are strategic entry points for the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global infrastructure project. The UK increasingly 
cooperates with China on infrastructural capacity-building, for example in the UK-China 
Infrastructure alliance and the UK-China Infrastructure Academy (UK Government 2016). 
Sustainable development strategies are crucial for long-term improvements of ‘human well-
being, social equity and environmental integrity, and the particular system qualities that can 
sustain these’ (Leach, Stirling and Scoones 2010: 5). China, the UK, Kenya and Sri Lanka, 
as members of the United Nations (UN), have committed themselves to the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, to achieve sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth 
and to eradicate poverty holistically and globally (UN 2015). All four countries have since 
integrated the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into their national and/or 
international development agendas. Their varying political landscapes, however, mean that 
actual commitments to the SDGs differ as national agendas take precedence. 
 
National politics and agendas shape the foreign strategies of the UK and China. The UK 
follows the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) strategy to 
target economic development and welfare of developing countries (OECD 2019). Aid is 
disbursed primarily through overseas development assistance, with a traditional focus on 
alleviating poverty through economic development and humanitarian interventions. This 
strategy is likely to change with the changing institutional structures of development and 
foreign policy in the UK. The UK’s post-Brexit strategy Global Britain aims at expanding and 
deepening overseas networks. Moreover, there is a foreseeable merger between the UK 
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Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) (Worley 2020). The UK’s development strategy may morph into mechanisms 
similar to the Aid for Trade strategies currently prevalent in the Netherlands (Savelli, 
Schwartz and Ahlers 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019) or the Aid for Trade approach 
active in Britain from the 1970s to 1990s (Killick 2005: 669). These strategies aim to promote 
trade for national development (World Trade Organization n.d.), representing a shift from 
human development to an economics-centric approach. 
 
Conversely, China operates outside the OECD governance regime and classifies foreign 
assistance differently. The Chinese aid strategy aims to help recipient countries build up 
the capacity to become self-reliant and independent in development, without imposing 
political agendas and interfering in internal affairs. China uses state finances to provide 
foreign aid through grants and interest-free loans. Concessional loans are provided by the 
Export-Import Bank of China (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011). 
While the UK focuses on poverty elimination, governance, security and economic 
development, China prioritises economic advancement through infrastructure capacity-
building. The engagement of the UK and China in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are 
significant for the achievement of sustainable development, possibly spilling over its 
positive effects to entire regions. This economic cooperation with the UK and China helps 
create opportunities for the concerned countries to diversify their trade relations, to receive 
investments and to cooperate on development agendas with various partners. Despite 
sub-Saharan Africa’s economic openness and ongoing economic relationships with 
international players, the region has not been able to sustainably develop and reduce 
poverty substantially. Aspiring development is challenging in sub-Saharan Africa due to a 
lagging pace of growth, a consistent record of failed states, conflicts, famines and 
disasters, and therefore high numbers of inter-regional refugees (Killick 2005). 
 
Kenya experiences similar development challenges despite a sustained economic growth 
and clear improvements across the range of human development indices (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2018). Sri Lanka, on the other hand, faces 
developmental challenges in a different socioeconomic landscape. Economically, it has 
been hindered by a persistent balance of payment deficit. Political instability and social 
ethnic tensions are also primary causes of its stagnation. 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, one of the most targeted areas for poverty reduction, development 
relations shift with the rapid economic growth of emerging global powers like China. The UK 
as a traditional donor and trade partner, may also undergo changing development relations 
as trade renegotiations commence with African countries, like Kenya, following the British 
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exit (Brexit) from the EU (Gu et al. 2017). Conversely, traditional donors, including the UK, 
have withdrawn from Sri Lanka recently. As well as its ascension into the middle-income 
category (World Bank 2019b: np), Sri Lanka has also been shunned for its record of alleged 
human rights violations (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) 2015). However, the UK may start taking an interest in Sri Lanka as it prepares for 
its transition out of the European Union and looks toward the Commonwealth countries to 
strengthen economic relations. Furthermore, the UK can also look forward to working with 
China in Sri Lanka, an important hub for the BRI and an important political ally for China. 
 
As the UK and China both engage in Kenya and Sri Lanka, trilateral cooperation 
mechanisms can create more sustainable and efficient development strategies which are 
mutually beneficial for every party’s economic development (DFID and Greening 2014). 
Trilateral cooperation emerges as development partners increasingly recognise their 
complementarity and the possibility for financial and technical collaboration. Trilateral 
development cooperation usually refers to a Northern state or agency working with countries 
involved in South-South cooperation (OECD 2016). South-South cooperation arose from the 
changing global context: the wish to challenge the hegemony of traditional global 
governance structures that favour states typically located in the global North and the 
expansion of economies in the global South (Gray and Gills 2016). The UK’s and China’s 
development trajectories intersect with that of their bilateral partners, for example in fields of 
infrastructure and scientific research. The UK and China share communication platforms and 
have regular discussions on development projects in Africa. Trilateral cooperation is likely to 
expand globally and upscale in the future with partners like Kenya and Sri Lanka. Trilateral 
cooperation can be seen as the future of international development cooperation. 
1.1 Section summary 
This report presents Chinese and British engagements in Kenya and Sri Lanka, examining 
areas that can bring about benefits for all parties. The following sections direct discussions 
on future possibilities of international development cooperation between the UK, China and 
Kenya as well as the UK, China and Sri Lanka. 
Section 2 draws on the case studies. We present the development visions of Kenya and Sri 
Lanka and examine how partnerships with the UK and China can help national governments 
drive the wanted change. We analyse their bilateral economic engagements (trade, foreign 
direct investment and development assistance) as well as other cooperative projects 
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involving skills transfer and human development projects. We then present country-specific 
opportunities.  
For Kenya, we recommend the following areas of cooperation:  
• trade (research on the diversification and value-addition of export products;  
• negotiations on lowering trade barriers;  
• integrating Kenya into the global value chains in the manufacturing sector;  
• advancing Kenya as an outsourcing location in the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector);  
• security;  
• anti-corruption measurements;  
• effective city management for affordable housing;  
• renewable energy infrastructures;  
• climate resilient agriculture for social protection;  
• capacity-building on national laws and working cultures; and  
• trilateral cooperation for universal health care.  
The existing trilateral cooperation between the UK, China and Africa, and other trilateral 
activities Kenya is involved in, provide entry points for learning from trilateral structures and 
strategies and to expand to more decentralised, participatory and effective trilateral 
cooperation strategies between the UK, China and Kenya. 
 
For Sri Lanka, we recommend: 
 
• trilateral cooperation in the areas of trade (streamlining global supply chain of the 
apparel industry and promoting APTA concessions; 
 
• mediation for intra-regional trade); 
 
• investment (into human capital, infrastructure, ecotourism and technology (for 
agriculture and security)); 
 
• education; 
 
• health; 
 
• reconciliation and social inequality; and 
 
• improving bureaucratic efficiency. 
 
While there are no current trilateral models of cooperation between the UK, China and Sri 
Lanka, there is much to learn from trilateral models the three countries are currently 
engaged in. We explore the challenges and achievements of these models to propose 
what a trilateral initiative between Sri Lanka, China and the UK may look like. 
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Section 3 outlines the bilateral engagements between the UK and China as their 
relationship determines development priorities influential in trilateral cooperation. Current 
bilateral platforms between the UK and China can also be leveraged upon in new trilateral 
models. The UK and China mainly engage in areas such as trade and industry, energy and 
transport, finance, people-to-people exchanges and research. Infrastructure has become an 
essential cooperation linkage in the last few years. As the UK and China build trilateral 
platforms with Africa, trilateral cooperation is likely to expand. The increasing convergence 
of British and Chinese development approaches also provide political impetus for trilateral 
cooperation. We provide an overview of reoccurring challenges in trilateral cooperation 
mechanisms. We recommend strategies to address these with different levels of intervention 
suggesting potential partners from the UK, China, Kenya and Sri Lanka. 
 
Section 4 provides a summary on findings related to trilateral cooperation. We highlight the 
potential and challenges of UK-China engagements in Kenya and Sri Lanka and trilateral 
engagement. 
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2 Country study findings 
Global partnerships can support the national development priorities of concerned 
countries, by cooperating in priority areas and in supporting implementations. Both the UK, 
as traditional, and China, as emerging, cooperation partners are influential actors in trade, 
investment, development assistance, people-to-people exchanges and skills transfer. The 
next section presents the cases of Kenya and Sri Lanka. We identify their national 
development priorities and assess their bilateral relations with the UK and China, 
demonstrating some opportunities and challenges, which offer entry points for trilateral 
cooperation opportunities. 
 2.1 Kenya 
2.1.1 Kenya’s national development priorities 
To understand Kenya’s development trajectory, this chapter sets out Kenya’s development 
progress and challenges, and the national development plan Vision 2030. Vision 2030 is a 
reaction of the Kenyan government to address key development challenges and to achieve 
sustainable development.  
2.1.1.1 Development progress and challenges 
Kenya is one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa and is engaged in 
significant political, structural and economic reforms to tackle its key development 
challenges (Trading Economics 2020; World Bank 2019a). Kenya has quickly transformed 
from an agrarian economy to a diversified market focused on manufacturing, logistics and 
technology. Strong private consumption played a part in the large GDP expansion in the last 
few years (Oxford Business Group 2019). Kenya’s GDP annual growth rate averaged 5.4 
per cent from 2005 to 2019 (Trading Economics 2020: np). Kenya has also demonstrated a 
steady progress in human development. Between 1990 and 2018, Kenya saw significant 
improvements in the areas of income, health and education (UNDP 2019). The UNDP’s 
assessment concluded that Kenya’s 2018 Human Development Index is below average for 
countries in the medium human development group but above average for countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (ibid: 4). In addition, Kenya ranked 94 out of 157 in the 2017 Human Capital 
Index, a rating which was ‘higher than what would be predicted for its income level’ (World 
Bank Data 2018: 2). 
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Despite this positive development, the country faces challenges in relation to ‘poverty, 
inequality, climate change, continued weak private sector investment and the vulnerability of 
the economy to internal and external shocks’ (World Bank 2019a: np). Additionally, the 
Kenyan economy is characterised by governance challenges, notably corruption. A 2017 
Kenya Corruption Report concluded that ‘Kenya’s competitiveness is held back by high 
corruption levels that penetrate every sector of the economy’ (GAN Integrity 2017: np). 
Contributing to this is a weak judicial system, endemic bribery among public officials, 
widespread tax evasion, and rampant fraud in public procurement (ibid). All these acts are 
prohibited under a 2003 law and 2016 Bribery Act but remain prevalent due to inadequate 
enforcement by ‘weak and corrupt public institutions’ (ibid: np). Almost 40 per cent of 
Kenyans live in poverty, with 14.5 per cent in extreme poverty. The country's unemployment 
rate stood at 9.30 in 2019, above the world average of 5.27 for the period of 1991 to 2019 
(World Bank 2020a: np). The population is also vulnerable to natural disasters. In 2017, the 
Kenyan Government declared a severe drought a national emergency, in which 5.6 million 
people were reported to require humanitarian assistance (UNDP 2018: 9). High poverty can 
be found particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands covering 85 per cent of Kenya's 
landmass (DFID 2014: 3). Moreover, conflict is a perennial issue in Kenya and relates to a 
variety of entry points including its diverse demography and social fragmentation. These 
social cleavages manifest in visible forms of discrimination and marginalisation, unequal 
land distribution and ownership in relation to property rights, partisan politics and endemic 
corruption. Social unrest is further exacerbated by the government’s politicised, exclusive 
and slow response on conflict and terrorism (Rohwerder 2015). 
2.1.1.2 Kenya’s national development vision 
In response to these challenges, in 2008 the Kenyan Government launched a long-term 
national development vision: Vision 2030. This strategy aims to turn the country into a 
‘newly industrialising, middle-income country providing a high-quality life to all its citizens by 
2030’ (Government of Kenya 2018: np). These goals contribute to the SDGs and the African 
Union’s Africa Agenda 2063 (African Union 2015; UN 2015). 
 
Vision 2030 sets out the Big Four development priorities: 
 
• Manufacturing; 
 
• Universal healthcare; 
 
• Affordable housing; and 
 
• Food security. 
(Government of Kenya 2018) 
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The Kenyan Government aims to promote national economic development by 
increasing infrastructure capacities, promoting sustainable development and 
accelerating poverty eradication (World Bank 2018a). 
 
Three pivotal pillars (economic, political and social) have been identified to tackle Kenya’s 
developmental challenges and are represented in five-year medium plans (2008-2012, 
2012-2017 and 2018-2022). The economic pillar settled on eight priority sectors which 
promise to raise Kenya's GDP growth rate to 10 per cent per annum by 2030. These 
sectors include tourism, agriculture and livestock, wholesale and retail, trade, 
manufacturing, financial services, business process offshoring and IT-enabled services 
(Government of Kenya 2018; The National Treasury and Planning Kenya 2018). 
 
The political pillar addresses strategies for Kenya to become a ‘democratic political 
system that is issue-based, people-centred, result-oriented and accountable to the 
public’, to entrench equality and harness diversity of Kenya’s people to benefit all (The 
National Treasury and Planning Kenya 2018: 99). 
 
The social pillar envisions prosperity and well-being through a ‘just and cohesive society that 
enjoys equitable socioeconomic development in a clean and secure environment’ through the 
improvements of the sectors of education and training, health, water and sanitation, 
environment, housing and urbanisation, gender, youth, sports and culture (ibid: 72). 
Table 1: The Vision 2030 formulates 'foundations', which are strategies to achieve the 
three pillars 
 
Foundations 
  
Future pathways and strategies 
 
 
    
 
      
 
      
 
 Infrastructure  Increasing manufacturing and exports requires improvements to 
 
 capacity building  transport, electrification and communication networks 
 
    
 
 Macroeconomic  To address low levels of underlying inflation, limited public sector 
 
 stability  deficits, a stable exchange rate, low interest rates and to maintain 
 
    and stimulate investment 
 
    
 
 Continuity in  To create better environments for businesses and for Kenyans to 
 
 governance reforms  enjoy individual rights manifested in the constitution 
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Enhanced equity For people in particular in arid and semi-arid districts, communities 
and wealth creation with high rates of poverty and unemployment, and vulnerable 
opportunities groups such as young people and women 
  
Energy To compete with foreign energy providers 
  
Science, technology To improve the efficiency of the three pillars and advancing 
and innovation economic development in other industrialising countries through 
 research 
  
Land reforms To drive economic transformation through appropriate land use 
  
Human Resources For a competitive and industrialising economy 
Development  
  
Security For lowering costs for doing business and providing secure living 
 and working environments 
  
Public Sector To build a public service which is citizen-focused and results- 
Reforms orientated to provide transparency and accountability 
  
Source: The National Treasury and Planning Kenya (2018) 
Twelve years on from the publication of Vision 2030, Kenya has made significant progress 
including improvements in connectivity, for example through the construction of the 
Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Road Expansion Programme. Governance 
mechanisms have improved with the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010. Improved 
health care and education provision are other successes (The National Treasury and 
Planning Kenya 2018). 
Challenges remain in the areas of security, poverty, inequality and climate change 
(ibid). Various factors slow down the implementation of Vision 2030, including 
corruption, the mismanagement of finances as well as rapid population growth and a 
disproportionately large population of young people combined with high rates of 
unemployment. 
The UK, as a traditional, and China, as an emerging, cooperation partner can support 
Kenya to achieve its vision. The next section will analyse the UK’s engagement in Africa 
and Kenya. 
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2.1.2 The UK in Kenya 
As part of the Commonwealth, Kenya has had extensive historical relations with the UK. 
Kenya is the largest, most diversified and innovative economy in East Africa (World 
Bank 2019a). Several characteristics give Kenya an advantage: ‘its human capacity’, 
‘available capital’ giving the potential to ‘create jobs and to reduce poverty’, as well as its 
‘entrepreneurial energy’ (DFID 2014: 3). Kenya holds much potential and is therefore an 
attractive economic partner for the UK. 
This section outlines an overview over engagements between the UK and Kenya focusing 
on trade relations, investment, development assistance and civil society cooperation. This 
leads up to an analysis on how the UK is or can be further engaged in achieving Kenya’s 
Vision 2030 to overcome development challenges. 
2.1.2.1 Economic relations 
Trade 
The trade relationship between Kenya and the UK has gradually transformed, with the trade 
balance becoming increasingly beneficial to the UK. Kenya imported US$672 million worth 
of products from the UK in 2014, compared to US$513 million in 2018 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) n.d.). The main products imported in 
2018 were machinery, vehicles and pharmaceutical products (COMTRADE n.d.). 
Simultaneously, the export revenue from the UK for Kenya has significantly fallen. Kenya 
exported products worth US$497 million to the UK in 2014, compared to US$406 million in 
2018 (UNCTAD n.d.). Kenyan exports to the UK are generally low value, primary products: 
mainly coffee, tea, mate and spices, vegetables, cut flower and plants. The UK is one of the 
biggest importers of Kenyan goods (COMTRADE n.d.) and Kenya is highly dependent on 
the UK. 
Kenya has faced a contraction in its exports and a trade deficit with the UK since 2010 
(Figure 2). Kenya violated the EU’s maximum residue limit regulations of certain pesticides 
to fruit and vegetables, which banned Kenya from selling to European market from 2009 to 
2014 (Krishnan, te Velde and Were 2018). Despite changing course to ensure compliance 
to the regulation, Kenya is still highly regulated by European norms. Goods exported to the 
EU are often sent back. Ironically, the EU is producing and exporting pesticides to Kenya, 
which under EU law are not permitted to be used within the EU (Kamau 2019). Kenya could 
renegotiate its terms of trade with the UK. The UK, however, has stringent regulations on 
pesticides albeit being the seventh largest pesticide exporter itself (Ross 2017; Workman 
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2020), making a change unlikely. Since the incident in 2009, the UK has started importing 
products from other countries, including flowers from Ethiopia and Colombia and coffee from 
Cote d’Ivoire. Kenya now faces stiff competition from other countries with similar trade 
structures, some of which have captured greater market share in the UK (Krishnan, te Velde 
and Were 2018). 
Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) financial flows from the UK to Kenya decreased drastically 
from US$184.5 million in 2013 to US$54.7 million in 2018 in diverse sectors, including 
manufacturing, hospitality, chemicals and oil and gas (UNCTAD n.d.). However, the British 
government recently announced its intentions to inject over US$1.72 billion of private British 
investment into Kenya at the UK-Africa Investment Summit held on 20 January 2020. 
Investments are meant to support businesses and to create jobs in Kenya and the UK (UK 
Government 2020d) 
Nevertheless, FDI in Kenya is exceedingly low, both for flows and stock. Only 0.9 per cent of 
total FDI stock for sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 goes to Kenya (ibid: np). FDI has decreased 
in the whole Eastern African region since 2015, likely because of the persistence of non-tariff 
barriers hindering trade flows (Calabrese and Eberhard-Ruiz 2016). Prominent non-tariff 
barriers such as the quality and safety standards, import bans, customs and trade facilitation 
measures, corruption and security issues decrease the ease of doing business in the region, 
creating an unattractive environment for companies and investors. These barriers reduce the 
benefits of regional integration and fail to promote the region as an attractive single 
investment destination (ibid; Mendez-Parra, Ragga and Sommer 2020).  
According to Dr. Moses Muriira Ikiara (Ikiara 2019), the managing director of Kenyan 
Investment Authority responsible for promoting foreign and domestic investment, Kenya 
works on researching and profiling the global market to identify opportunities for certain 
sectors by negotiating demand avenues with the most appropriate, selected investors. 
Existing value chains need to be coordinated and refined in cooperation with investors and 
the identification of global demand centres to achieve improved economic outcomes. The 
establishment of inward-investment supply chain strategies works most effectively, 
according to Dr. Ikiara, when the whole value chain is restructured and adapted to meet this 
identified demand. This research and communication process with investors is aimed to link 
the market to investments (Ikiara 2019). 
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2.1.2.2 Development cooperation 
The UK as a traditional donor has long provided Official Development Aid (ODA) to sub-
Saharan African countries like Kenya. DFID explicitly aims to support Kenya’s development 
priorities of the Vision 2030 by promoting political and macroeconomic stability, sustained 
economic growth and social development ‘underpinned by rapidly expanding infrastructure‘ 
(DFID 2014: 3). The UK defined three deliverables in 2018 for Kenya supporting the goal of 
poverty elimination: economic development, basic services and building resilience to crises, 
as well as building stability and institutions (DFID 2018).  
A meeting between UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta 
in January 2020 laid the foundations for the UK-Kenya Strategic Partnership 2020-2025, 
built on five pillars: 
• Mutual prosperity; 
• Sustainable development; 
• Security and stability; 
• Climate change; and 
• People to people exchanges. 
(UK Government 2020d) 
Currently, there are 41 active projects implemented by UK government departments in 
Kenya, which cover these deliverables and pillars. The following table highlights some of 
them: 
Table 2: Key active UK projects in Kenya 
UK Department/Agency Project/Programme 
UK DFID Kenya Market Assistance Programme (MAP) 
Adolescent Girls Initiative - Kenya 
Deepening Democracy Programme 
Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the 
Northern Territories (Re-INVENT) 
Regional Economic Development for Investment and 
Trade (REDIT) Programme 
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CDC Group plc Garden City (mixed-used development comprising retail, 
office and residential components in Nairobi, Kenya) 
M-Kopa (off-grid solar provision project) 
UK - Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office 
Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules 
based International System in Kenya 
Frontline Diplomatic Enabling Activity in Kenya 
UK - Medical Research 
Council 
Epidemiology, Ecology and Socio-Economics of Disease 
Emergence in Nairobi 
UK - Department of Health and 
Social Care (DHSC) 
Fleming Fund – Country and Regional Grants and 
Fellowships Programme 
UK - Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy 
British Council - Kenya - Newton Fund 
Department for Environment, 
Food, and Rural Affairs 
Phytosanitary capacity development in developing 
countries 
(DFID n.d.) 
Kenya received US$181.6 million of net ODA in 2014 from the UK, compared to US$146.6 
million in 2018 (OECD n.d.). ODA decreased throughout the time period, but during the UK-
Africa Investment Summit on 20 January 2020, the UK made a commitment to back Kenya 
with US$510.88 million of UK aid in the future (UK Government 2020b).  
DFID increasingly provides ODA in arid land regions mostly affected by droughts, food 
insecurity and economic stagnation (DFID 2014; McVeigh 2018). The agency supports the 
creation of quality jobs and working places, which stimulate an improved business 
environment, urbanisation and international investments (ibid; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India 2017). Infrastructure is defined as critical for economic growth and the 
boost of businesses (Mbabazi 2020). Projects on energy and urban infrastructure are the 
most pronounced (UK Government (2020a). In 2018 and 2019, DFID’s expenditure for 
economic development in Kenya made up the biggest proportion of ODA (36 per cent) and a 
sum of US$50.96 million (DFID 2018: 1).  
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DFID and FCO link development to security and promote good governance and stability 
(Wild and Elhawary 2012). In Kenya, the two agencies contribute US$15.45 million of ODA 
to tackle underlying causes of conflict and corruption through political reform (DFID 2018: 1). 
Kenya contributes to the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia and hosts many 
refugees of the region and is thus a critical security actor in the region. At the same time, the 
country faces setbacks due to inner conflicts, which makes ODA in the security sector 
important for Kenya (DFID 2018; UNHCR Kenya 2020). DFID aims to fight corruption and 
increase self-reliance of the aid receivers through governance capacity-building projects 
(British High Commission Nairobi 2019; McVeigh 2018). 
The UK addressed human development in Kenya by focusing on basic services and building 
resilience to crises, for example by donating in health services and response mechanisms to 
humanitarian crisis emerging from droughts and conflict, working to deliver long-term 
solutions for refugees entering the country (DFID 2018). Many bilateral development 
programs in education, health and climate change will be readdressed through investments 
in global funds to improve national and county government capability and to direct efforts to 
a sub-national level to address deepest poverty and conflict (ibid; McVeigh 2018). 
2.1.2.3 Employment, skills transfer and civil society cooperation 
During the UK-Africa Investment Summit, the UK agreed to initiate a new project 
development facility to provide skills and expertise for economic projects and to attract 
finances from the private sector (UK Government 2020b). This is the result of a long-lasting 
relationship between the UK and African countries as well as the mobility of people and 
companies. Around 200 British companies are active in Kenya and provide employment for 
Kenyans. DFID (2018: 2) notes that ‘1 in 10 working Kenyans is employed by a British 
company’.  
The UK-Kenya partnership is strengthened by entrepreneurship schemes, innovation 
projects and the building a UK-Kenya Tech Hub. UK science, technology and innovation 
teams invest in science relationships with Kenya, for example through investments in the 
Newton Fund. Entrepreneurship programmes like TeXchange and Global EdTech Awards 
will soon commence in Kenya (UK Government 2018). The UK Government’s Tech Hub 
Network Flagship Go Global Africa 2019 programme brought digital start-ups together 
aiming for partnerships to create jobs, secure international investment and to create 
business opportunities for both the UK and Kenya (UK Government 2019). This means that 
we can look forward to a more robust commercial relationship between the UK and Kenya, 
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with opportunities for an increased employment of Kenyans by British companies and 
accompanying transfer of skills to the local labour force. 
In 2019, the British and Kenyan government hosted a two-day symposium in Nairobi on 
collaboration on affordable housing and sustainable infrastructure, which involved 
researchers, policymakers, businesses and civil society delegates. Ambitions to strengthen 
research relationships mutually beneficial for both countries have been increasing in the past 
few years (British High Commission Nairobi and Republic of Kenya Ministry of Education 
2019). In security matters, the British Army Training Unit Africa provides Kenyans peace 
support training, while British soldiers prepare to deploy in Somalia in Kenyan facilities 
(Oxford Research Group 2019). Moreover, the British Council engages with civil society 
organisation, government ministries and institutions in the UK and Kenya to collaborate in 
areas such as ‘youth and community engagement, social entrepreneurship, equal 
opportunity and diversity, sport, and active citizenship’ (British Council 2020: np). 
While cooperation between Kenya and the UK contributes to economic development, 
poverty elimination and security in diverse ways, China builds its cooperation strategy with 
Kenya mainly through infrastructure projects. 
2.1.3 China in Kenya 
China has a long history of providing fraternal support and solidarity with African 
independence movements and post-independence states. Since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has engaged in economic 
cooperation with African countries, including Kenya (Hanauer and Morris 2014). This section 
analyses the bilateral engagement between China and Africa, its effect on Kenya and direct 
linkages between China and Kenya. 
2.1.3.1 China in Africa 
In the past two decades, we have seen China’s engagement with Africa transition from the 
primacy attached to political relations to one grounded substantively in economic and 
development relations (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2006; Gu et al. 2015; 
Gu, Chuanhong and Mukwereza, 2016). This was situated in the context of the advent of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the publication of China's Africa Policy in 
2006 and the implementation of China’s Going Out policy for the internationalisation of 
Chinese enterprises. In this process, an important driver for cooperation was Africa’s overall 
strengthening, sustained economic growth and greater political and social stability. Today, 
China’s relationship with Africa is largely focused upon: 
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• strengthening trade; 
• utilising investment; 
• promoting Chinese corporate engagement;  
• providing targeted bilateral and multilateral technical development assistance; 
and 
• buttressing this with infrastructure capacity-building in transport, 
communications, energy, health, education, recreation, and civic buildings. 
(Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2018; Hanauer and Morris 2014) 
Since 2009, China has been Africa’s largest trade partner; it is also an increasingly important 
investor and financier (China Africa Research Initiative 2020; COMTRADE n.d.). China 
reported that ‘development assistance to Africa increased over the last decade, reaching 
US$7.5bn for 2010-12, while the proportion of total assistance to Africa also increased from 
45.7% in 2009 to 51.8% in 2012’ in their White Paper 2011 on aid (Gu et al. 2017: 20). The 
Chinese government and State Council published two White Papers on its foreign aid, one in 
2011 and one in 2014 (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011). As 
approaches to development aid between China and the UK differ, it is hard to compare 
Chinese foreign development efforts with the standards by the OECD-DAC bureaucracy. 
China understands development as holistic approach in connection with investment, aid and 
trade incentives. 
FOCAC provides the main vehicle for formulating joint bilateral and multilateral priorities 
between African countries and China for planning, funding and implementation strategies 
and for driving relationships (FOCAC n.d.). FOCAC as a multilateral platform and vehicle for 
China-Africa cooperation, offers the foundation for China’s policy towards Africa and aids the 
implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Ehizuelen and Mitchell 2018; King 
2019). The BRI is one of the largest cooperation linkages between China and Africa in 
recent years (Ehizuelen and Mitchell 2018; King 2019). It is intended to act as a primary 
force for facilitating critical investment to build closer and stronger channels of maritime and 
continental connections from China to international markets (Belt and Road Portal 2017; 
Xinhua 2015). At its core, it concentrates on building greater capacity, principally through 
infrastructure and focuses on transport, communications and energy (Government of China 
2015). FDI and trade are integral components in an approach also including foreign aid and 
humanitarian support. This is stressed by the consensus of the Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation (BRF) on promoting high-quality cooperation under the BRI, 
stressing open, green and clean approaches, as well as goals of high-standard, livelihood-
improving and sustainable development (Xinhua 2019a). 
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2.1.3.2 Economic relations 
The Kenyan Government expressed a strong interest in the BRI in a meeting held in Nairobi 
in August 2016 between President Kenyatta and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Farooq 
et al. 2018). According to Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya will have the chance to 
benefit from the acquisition of ‘skills, assets and finances necessary to participate in the 
development of the infrastructure corridors that will enhance connectivity, support trade and 
reduce the cost of doing business between our countries.’ (Xinhua 2017: np). The Kenyan 
President committed to align Kenya’s development strategies with the BRI (Farooq et al. 
2018; Government of China 2016). The basis for cooperation was consolidated at the first 
BRF in May 2017. Understanding each other's key roles as trading partners with industrial 
capacity elevated the bilateral relationship between Kenya and China to a ‘comprehensive 
strategic cooperative partnership’ (Xinhua 2019b: np). Since then, Kenya has actively 
participated in the BRI and agreed to the Chinese discourse of a win-win situation (Xinhua 
2017). Kenya confirmed its willingness to act as a launchpad for BRI in both Central and 
West Africa during the second BRF (Xinhua 2019a).  
The BRI is only one of the connection points between China and Kenya. The table below 
aims to illustrate some of the agreements between the two countries. They have been 
signed on a variety of topics including trade, education, technology, energy or tourism. Some 
agreements are signed on a national level, while others are signed between corporate 
partners. As data on agreements from the Chinese side is not easily accessible and 
transparent, the chart combines information from a variety of data points. 
Table 3: Existing Kenya-China agreements on various levels 
Parties Agreement/Project Purpose 
The National Treasury of 
Kenya, Ministry of 
Commerce of China 
Agreement on the 
Economic and Technical 
Cooperation 
To enhance financial 
cooperation between China and 
Kenya and the encouragement 
to expand trade relationships 
(Onjala 2008) 
China National Tourism 
Administration and the 
Kenya Tourist Board 
Memrandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on 
Tourism 
To implement organised group 
travel by Chinese citizens to 
Kenya and to expand people-to-
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people exchanges (Xinhua 
2004) 
The Government of Kenya 
and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China, with Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), 
e.g. China 
Communications 
Construction Company 
(CCCC) 
  
 
MoU on the Belt and 
Road Initiative with 
projects like the Nairobi 
Standard Gauge Railway, 
or the Konza Data Center 
and Smart City Facilities 
Project 
 
To improve the infrastructure 
capacity in Kenya and build 
strategic connections in the 
vision of the BRI (maritime road 
through Mombasa port, land 
roads to connect neighbouring 
countries) (China Road and 
Bridge Corporation (CRBC) 
2020; Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in the 
Republic of Kenya 2019; 
Government of China 2015) 
Chinese based Giant Steel 
Company Sinosteel and 
the Government of Kenya 
MoU on Kenyan steel 
plant 
To develop a steel plant in 
Kenya supplying material for 
infrastructure projects (Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and 
Enterprise Development Kenya 
2015) 
Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology of 
Kenya and Chinese 
Academy of Sciences 
MoU on the Sino-Africa 
Joint Research Center 
(SAJOREC) in Nairobi, 
Kenya 
To promote cooperation in the 
areas of science, research and 
innovation ‘in the areas of 
ecosystem, agriculture, health, 
the development and 
demonstration of adaptable 
technologies’ (Xinhua 2018a: 
np) 
General Administration of 
Customs of China and 
Kenya's ministry of 
MoU on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) 
To provide better market access 
for Kenyan agriculture product 
into the Chinese market (fruits, 
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Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
nuts, avocados, flowers, stevia, 
meat, leather) (Morangi 2018) 
General Administration of 
Customs of China and 
Kenya's ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries, in consultation 
with Vertical Agro 
Agreement on the export 
of frozen avocados from 
Kenya to China 
To expand exports from Kenya 
to China with specialised goods 
(Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in the 
Republic of Kenya 2019) 
China General Nuclear and 
the Kenya Nuclear 
Electricity Board 
MOU on the development 
of nuclear power in Kenya 
To carry out cooperation in 
nuclear development and 
capacity building in Kenya, 
including staff training and 
common research on 
construction, operation, fuel 
supply, nuclear security (World 
Nuclear News 2017) 
The Government of Kenya 
and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China 
Negotiations on a treaty 
on mutual legal 
assistance 
To combat economic crimes like 
corruption with investigative 
agencies tracing proceeds of 
crime (Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation and Xinhua 2019) 
 
The following sections analyse trade and investment structures and the development 
assistance relationship between China and Kenya, which are highly influenced by the BRI 
project in Kenya. 
 
Trade 
China became Kenya's largest trading partner in 2014 (Etyang 2015: 1) and Kenya has 
established itself as China's sixth-largest trading partner in Africa (White and Case 2018). In 
2017, Kenya's imports from China reached US$3,778 billion, accounting for approximately 
23 per cent of Kenya's total imports. However, Kenya's exports to China in 2017 were worth 
only US$96.7 million, representing 1.68 per cent of Kenya's total exports (COMTRADE n.d.; 
World Bank 2017: np).  
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Over 90 per cent of China’s main exports to Kenya are made up of higher value finished 
products, machinery and transportation equipment. In return, Kenyan exports to China are 
low value agricultural and natural resources. Kenya’s persistent balance of payments deficit 
is a critical issue (COMTRADE n.d.). Kenya’s total trade deficit to China amounts to US$1.1 
billion (Munda 2019: np). Kenya’s president Kenyatta voiced his concern about China 
‘flooding the continent with manufactured goods’ and aims to increase exports to China to 
rebalance the China-Africa and China-Kenya trade relationship (Pilling and Klasa 2017: np).  
The Kenyan government is addressing this deficit by prioritising the manufacturing industry, 
which could in the long-term compete with Chinese exports of manufactured goods if more 
FDI in the sector is stimulated and exports are diversified (Jepchirchir and Githahu 2019). 
Kenya recognises the need to improve the competitiveness of its manufactured products. 
The growth of manufacturing stagnated, averaging 2.9 per cent between 2013 and 2017 
(Government of Kenya 2018: np). To make its products more competitive, Kenya established 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Industrial and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
parks and invests in skill development and research. Kenya defines infrastructure as the 
means to establish a better economic advantage. It aims to improve its manufacturing in 
cotton, fibre and leather products, and to add value to its agricultural, fisheries and livestock 
products, including tea and coffee. Other high priority industries are machinery, electronics 
and automotive parts (Government of Kenya 2018). If the Kenyan government is to succeed 
in its ambition to become a manufacturing economy, it must protect its machinery and 
transportation equipment industries from cheaper Chinese imports.   
Overcoming the trade deficit will require negotiation between Kenya and China to find 
opportunities for mutual benefit. In Kenya’s third medium term plan, the government aims to 
address balance of trade deficits by promoting agricultural exports through value addition, 
accelerating industrialisation and implementing legal and institutional reforms (Government 
of Kenya 2018). The MoU on SPS supports this aim (Morangi 2018). Oil and titanium 
exports offer Kenya a potential for future higher-value exports to China or to invest in 
titanium manufacturing e.g. in the jewellery industry, which could be attractive to the Chinese 
market. China is an important export market for Kenya’s titanium. In 2017, Kenya’s titanium 
exports totalled US$133 million (Observatory of Economic Complexity World 2017: np). A 
recent agreement on the export of Kenyan avocados to China provides prospects for exports 
of further agricultural goods to China and an increase in revenue generation (PSCU 2019).  
China agreed on negotiations with Kenya and the EAC to address the trade deficit and 
emphasised the possibility of free trade agreements. The Kenyan government stated 
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however that it is not yet ready for a free trade agreement with China as the two countries 
are at different development stages (Miriri 2019a).  
Furthermore, Chinese goods are likely to displace Kenya’s export market in Africa. China 
has a comparative advantage in Kenyan primary export goods including iron and steel, 
plastics, and food products (Trading Economics 2018). Uganda and Tanzania are Kenya’s 
largest market for exports, predominantly iron, steel, plastics, and food products. Therefore, 
Kenya needs to diversify its exports to maintain trade with its neighbouring countries 
(Jepchirchir and Githahu 2019). If not, the overall trade deficit will worsen. In recent years, 
high dependence on agricultural products has prevented Kenya from diversifying its exports 
(Krishnan, te Velde and Were 2018).  
Foreign direct investment, loans and grants 
According to Chinese Government statistics, the stock of China’s outward FDI in Africa 
reached US$43.3 billion in 2017, representing 2.4 per cent of China’s total global FDI stock. 
Kenya received US$410 million in FDI in 2017 from China, compared to US$78.7 million in 
2012 (COMTRADE n.d.). China has quickly established itself as one of the most high-profile 
single-country providers of finance for, and construction of, African infrastructure projects. 
The 2018 annual review of construction trends review by Deloitte concludes that China is 
financing one in five and constructing one in three projects in Africa. The report concludes 
that the BRI can stimulate investment ‘and promote intra-regional and global trade’ (Deloitte 
2018: 55). 
China is also an increasingly important investor and financier to Kenya. China’s non-financial 
direct investment in Kenya in 2018 had doubled over that of the previous year to about 
US$520 million. This FDI is primarily directed into construction, but also industrial 
engineering, the creative industry, transportation equipment, food and beverage, and 
information and communication technology (Government of China 2017). 
Chinese companies contract for nearly 50 per cent of Kenya’s infrastructure projects, 
including roads, bridges and ports (China Africa Research Initiative 2020). Chinese acquirers 
and contractors to Kenya are mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (ibid; Suokas 2018). 
Kenya’s infrastructure needs are extensive and highlighted under Kenya’s Vision 2030 (The 
National Treasury and Planning Kenya 2018). Projects to address this include road 
infrastructure projects and the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, contributing to 
the Kenyan Government’s economic, developmental and cleaner energy strategy (ibid).  
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The Kenya National Electrification Strategy (KNES) is a roadmap for achieving universal 
access to electricity and contributing to renewable and clean energy by the year 2022 and 
contributes to energy access in Kenya (World Bank 2018a). A key project being funded by a 
concessional loan from the China EXIM Bank is a major solar power plant in the Northeast 
Kenyan town of Garissa, expected to generate 76,470 annual megawatt hours that will feed 
into Kenya’s national grid and provide the capacity to power 625,000 homes (Nduire 2018). 
A particular focus of the Second BRF was on a Green Silk Road; Green Investment 
Principles for Belt and Road Development (China Council for International Cooperation on 
Environment and Development 2019). 
Additionally, China invests in industrial parks and SEZs as a practical means of achieving its 
development objectives. After the Kenyan Government announced its commitment to 
establishing industrial parks and SEZs in September 2015 to attract investments, with an 
initial three zones designated for Kisumu, Mombasa and Lamu (Government of Kenya 2018; 
Oxford Business Group 2016). Currently, Kenya has the most SEZs in Africa: 61 out of 237 
African SEZs are Kenyan. SEZs offer a global policy environment that contributes to cross-
border investments and possibly inclusive sustainable development (UNCTAD 2019). In 
Kenya, SEZs account for nearly 10 per cent of exports (ibid). Kenya jumped from rank 136 in 
2015 to rank 56 in 2020 in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking (World Bank 
2015: 4; World Bank 2020b: 4). This was partly due to the establishment of SEZs, but also 
the removal of certain trade barriers and facilitating greater access to credit (McVeigh 2018). 
While SEZs have been successfully implemented in China, the precise outcomes of SEZs 
yet need to be evaluated in Kenya. 
2.1.3.3 Employment, skills training, and technology transfer 
A McKinsey and Company report from 2017 (Jayaram, Kassiri and Yuan Sun 2017: 28) 
conducted in eight African countries concluded that approximately 396 Chinese enterprises 
operate in Kenya. Across Africa, the McKinsey survey found that Chinese firms display a 
willingness to invest in hiring African workers and maintain apprenticeship programmes. 
Chinese enterprises overwhelmingly employ and train local workers (ibid: 40). In the case of 
Kenya, a report by the Kenya-China Economic and Trade Association (KCETA) concluded 
that Chinese firms operating in Kenya have created over 50,000 local jobs with the 
proportion of local employees reaching 96 per cent in 2018 (Xinhua 2018b: np). The report 
also noted that Chinese firms in Kenya provided around 67,000 local employees with 
professional training in 2018 (ibid). Commenting on this Isaac Mbeche, Deputy Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Nairobi (UoN), argued that ‘Chinese firms have been devoted 
to cultivating talents and creating jobs in Kenya, enhancing the exchanges and cooperation 
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between the two countries under the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Gu 2018: np).  
However, employment issues remain. According to Federation of Kenyan Employers (FKE) 
Executive Director Jacqueline Mugo, the lack of knowledge on local labour laws and the 
understanding for local staff creates disputes between Chinese employers and local 
employees. These often occur because of ‘salaries below the minimum-wage standards and 
unfair termination’ (Murathe 2018: np). In the view of the FKE’s Director, the level of disputes 
results from unfamiliarity with Kenya’s labour law on behalf of the firms, leading them ‘to 
violate the law without knowing it’ (ibid).  
The 2017 BRF was marked by President Xi’s commitment to promoting technological 
cooperation (Bensen Wahlén 2019). At the centre of this commitment is the Belt and Road 
Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan (Sheng 2019). This plan 
proposed four elements: the Science and Technology People-to-People Exchange Initiative, 
the Joint Laboratory Initiative, the Science Park Cooperation Initiative and the Technology 
Transfer Initiative (ibid). The 2019 BRF included a sub-forum entitled the Innovation Road 
and the List of Deliverables states that the Chinese government proposes to launch the 
Action Plan (Belt and Road Forum 2019). 
Technology and innovation are key elements in driving the Kenyan Vision 2030. Huawei is 
an important partner to Kenya in this trajectory (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Huawei-Kenya collaboration 
Huawei’s contribution to technology and innovation in Kenya: 
• participation in Kenya’s Presidential Digital Talent Project (PDTP) as a career 
advisor and sponsor; 
• established the Huawei Eastern Africa Training Centre; 
• joining the ICT Caucus Meeting as a think tank and consultant to advise on 
Kenya’s national ICT plan; 
• partnering with Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile network operator, in 
establishing a new security management infrastructure; and 
• providing an effective Safe City solution. 
Sources: Huawei (2017; 2019); GSMA (2019) 
There is a Sino-Africa Joint Research Centre (SAJOREC) in Kenya encouraging innovation, 
whose innovations include the development of a type of toothpaste out of molar tooth sticks 
(SAJOREC 2017; Zhihao 2019). The China-Kenya Solid State Lighting Technology Transfer 
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Centre and a US$1 million agricultural research laboratory are funded by China and are 
intended to address low crop productivity among Kenya’s small- and large-scale farmers 
(African Farming and Food Processing 2015; African Review of Business and Technology 
2015). Kenya sets out contractual requirements for foreign enterprises for knowledge and 
skills transfers (Nyabwa and Kaniaru 2019). For example, the SGR project involved 40 
Kenyan students being funded by the contractor, CRBC, to undertake a four-year bachelor’s 
degree course in railway engineering at Beijing Jiatong University (Xinhua 2018c). The 
company also opened a railway technology transfer training facility in Voi, the CRBC 
Technology Transfer Competence Training Centre to improve the capacity of its Kenyan 
employees (Kawira 2015). 
2.1.3.4 Challenges with the BRI involvement 
The effectiveness and impact of China’s development cooperation with Africa is far from 
clear cut. On the one hand, China has provided significant financing, project management 
and implementation expertise for infrastructure projects, as well as BRI coordination and 
administration. China’s cooperation with Africa under the BRI has delivered a wide range of 
practical outcomes across transport, communications, energy, education, health, 
environment, and socio-cultural domains. The BRI contributed to bridging and facilitating 
inter- and intra-regional state and sub-state contacts to drive investment, connectivity and 
trade. As a continent, Africa has been relatively cautious in its record of engagement with the 
BRI. This caution remains, but there is an increasing and strengthening interest in the BRI 
among African states, business communities, and civil society organisations as 
demonstrable outcomes are resulting from this initiative (Baker 2017; OECD 2018; Renwick, 
Gu and Gong 2018). 
At the same time, challenges with the BRI in Africa relate to questions about: 
• where the finance is coming from to pay for the increasingly large number of 
projects; 
• the degree of robustness of project due diligence and risk assessment 
procedures; 
• the equity, transparency and accountability of tendering processes; 
• safeguarding concerning alignment of BRI practices with international norms and 
agreed expectations of right conduct, for example over tendering or 
environmental protection; 
• the critical issue of whether the BRI’s funding is creating debt traps for partner 
countries; and 
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• relatedly, whether this is contributing to pushback among existing or potential BRI 
participants. 
(Farooq et al. 2018; Renwick, Gu and Gong 2018) 
The BRI has raised concerns and criticisms that it is fuelling a debt crisis in developing 
countries (Chellaney 2017). The BRI is portrayed as ‘China’s grand plan for expanding its 
influence’ (Mendis and Wang 2019: np) and, for some commentators ‘threatens countries’ 
ability to achieve self-reliance’ (Green 2019: np).  
Kenya’s overall public debt has been increasing rapidly in recent years, which arose to 
around 57 per cent of GDP in the 2017-18 fiscal year (World Bank 2018b: np). China's debt 
to Kenya accounts for 66 per cent of its bilateral loans, making it the largest bilateral creditor 
of Kenya (Mubashir 2019; Were 2019). In Kenya, the experience of the SGR has raised 
questions over Kenya's indebtedness to China; over China's actual commitment to the 
intended development outcome rather than to the commercial and non-commercial loan 
provisions, and the corporate cultures and working practices of Chinese firms. Kenya's debt 
level is said to have risen as a result of the SGR rail project (Miriri 2019b; Renwick, Gu and 
Gong 2018). According to one commentator, 'Apart from the SGR loans, China is already 
the single-largest bilateral lender [to Kenya] owed US$3.5 billion … or 19.4 % of total 
external debt by the end of the second quarter of the 2016/17 fiscal year’ (Omondi 2017: np). 
The five-year grace period given by the China EXIM Bank expired in June 2019. Kenyan 
taxpayers are paying 0.7 per cent of the economy to the Chinese financing agencies for 
funding the Nairobi Mombasa stage of the SGR (ibid; Okoth 2020).  
Against this background and an increased risk management future in China, funding for the 
scheduled extension of the SGR would have been considered in the light of the provisions of 
the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road. These Principles 
advocate a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory and predictable financing environment 
that ensures sustainable economic and social development. Kenya is among 26 countries 
who have jointly formulated these Principles (Belt and Road Portal 2017). 
2.1.4 Summing up: The UK’s and China’s contributions to Kenya’s Vision 
2030 
The UK and China contribute to Kenya’s Vision 2030 by focusing their economic 
engagements with Kenya on Kenya’s Big Four and their ten foundations. 
The UK and China address Kenya’s foundation of macroeconomic stability as Kenya faces 
issues related to low investments, trade deficits with the UK and a persistent balance of 
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payments deficit with China. FDI is generally biased towards higher-income African countries 
with an educated labour force i.e. South Africa (Mendez-Parra, Ragga and Sommer 2020). 
British development projects stimulate improved business environments, the creation of 
quality jobs and a human resource development promising Kenya to become an increasingly 
attractive investment location. The UK aims to strengthen its trade and investment links with 
Kenya after Brexit and the UK-Africa Investment Summit. China similarly engages in projects 
to improve Kenya’s export balance, manufacturing performance and invests and supports 
constructing SEZs. Negotiations between the Kenyan and Chinese government contribute to 
understanding and deeper economic partnerships, seen in more recent MoUs. 
Infrastructure is another foundation under Kenya’s Vision 2030, which plays a predominant 
role in the British and Chinese engagement in Kenya. The BRI contributes to the vision of 
interconnected network of roads, railways, ports, airports, waterways and 
telecommunications and China’s support has concentrated on unblocking these flows in 
Nairobi and different parts of Kenya. Despite challenges related to the BRI, the Chinese 
Government has moved into a more sober stance regarding the BRI, with closer attention to 
risk exposure, project monitoring, and outcomes assessment and the BRI's members too are 
seeking to maximise their benefits from the BRI whilst minimising their risks. The UK 
increasingly focuses on infrastructure to ensure prosperity and sustainable development 
together with China. 
Economic activities need to suit environmental, social and corporate standards of 
investments. Disaster-resilient development projects address Kenya’s key challenges to 
economic growth and sustainable development, i.e. weak governance and corruption 
through British development programmes. Knowledge and skills transfer between the UK 
and Kenya, and China and Kenya are essential to foster science, technology and innovation 
ambitions. 
The UK engages in two of the Big Four; health care and affordable housing, more directly 
through social development strategies and investments in so-called soft sectors. Research 
cooperation on green infrastructure both with the UK and China guide the way towards the 
achievement of the goal of affordable housing. 
 
2.1.5 Trilateral cooperation 
2.1.5.1 UK-China-Africa trilateral cooperation 
As the UK and China have engaged in bilateral economic cooperation and development in 
African states for a long time, the two countries approached each other to cooperate in 
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economic affairs while guarding one’s own benefits (Buckley 2013; Chatham House 2019). 
Africa is a central point of cooperation and has immediate influences on the economy and 
sustainable development in Kenya. 
Trilateral cooperation with Africa was initiated after the first China-UK Business Summit in 
2009. Conversations started between then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and then 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who agreed on a plan for China–UK–Africa agricultural 
cooperation (Buckley 2013; Qianhui 2015). The China-UK Business Summits concluded with 
commitments from China and the UK to explore cooperation on infrastructure investment 
and construction in Africa, innovation development and research cooperation to continue 
and broaden joint action (Gu et al. 2017). The UK and China hold investment and business 
forums under the framework of Partnership for Investment and Growth in Africa, through 
which measures to support African development are discussed (UK Government and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China 2019). 
DFID plays a significant role in facilitating development cooperation (DFID 2010; UNDP 
2016). In response to the first Africa-UK-China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries in 
Beijing in 2010, the parties agreed on principles, priorities and mechanisms for trilateral 
cooperation to improve agricultural productivity and food security for the poorest population 
in Africa through the program Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low-Income 
Countries (AgriTT) (Buckley 2017; UK-China Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network 
2014). In 2011, DFID and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
(MOFCOM) signed an MoU to achieve the Millenium Development Goals through 
cooperation and to work specifically on agriculture, health and disaster management in 
Malawi and Uganda (UK Government 2011). US$12.7 million worth of knowledge sharing 
technology and expertise was transferred between the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and 
MOFCOM China between 2012 and 2016 (ibid). More recent partners of DFID are the China 
Development Bank in 2014 and the Development Research Center in 2015 to work on a 
China-UK Global Health Support Programme Pilot Project on Maternal and Child Health in 
Ethiopia and Myanmar; a China-UK-Tanzania Malaria Control Pilot Project. Technical 
cooperation and capacity building are accompanied with knowledge exchange between 
China and the UK to tackle challenges in Africa (UNDP 2016). 
During 2009 and 2010, the UK government, the Chinese Training Centre for Peacekeeping 
Civil Forces and the Kofi Annan International Training Centre for Peacekeeping together 
organised three training classes for African peacekeeping forces in China and Ghana 
(Hirono and Xu 2013). 
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International and multilateral organisations have also served as a platform for China–UK–
Africa cooperation. For example, the UNDP; various World Bank mechanisms, such as the 
World Bank Trust Fund; DFID; the Export-Import Bank of China; the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance; the Chinese Ministry of Commerce; and Chinese companies, have all cooperated 
on numerous small projects across Africa (OECD 2016; UNDP 2016). 
Both China and the UK are important economic and development partners for East Africa. 
With increasing trilateral cooperation strategies affecting African countries locally, Kenya 
quickly joined discussions. A China-Kenya-UK Trilateral Business MoU was signed by the 
Kenya-China Economic and Trade Association, British Chamber of Commerce Kenya, and 
Kenyan Private Sector Alliance in October 2017 to set out a framework for cooperation and 
business ties between China, the UK and Kenya (Kenya Private Sector Alliance 2017). This 
MoU provides a framework for cooperation between businesses from Kenya, China and the 
UK in areas including infrastructure development and communication. Chinese companies 
have worked with both Kenyan and British companies and business partners in areas like 
manufacturing, telecommunication, tourism and the financial sector (ibid). The MoU outlines 
an additional push for joint efforts. 
2.1.5.2 Kenya and trilateral cooperation 
Learning from best practices is essential when preparing future trilateral cooperation 
strategies. Kenya has amongst others been involved in the following trilateral projects with 
other high-income and middle-income countries, development agencies as well as 
international organisations. 
Table 4: Kenya's current tri- and multi-lateral projects 
Parties Trilateral 
Project 
Thematic 
Area(s)/ 
Criteria 
Outcomes / Progress 
Austria, Kenya, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda 
 
Strengthen 
capacities of 
CSOs to 
engage in 
Policy Dialogue 
in East Africa  
Capacity-
building of 
East African 
NGOs to 
engage in 
policy 
dialogue 
Strengthened the NGO’s capacities in 
the following aspects of Policy 
Dialogue: 
• Policy Dialogue and how to 
engage along the policy cycle 
• Evidence based research and 
policy analysis 
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(with seven 
East African 
partner NGOs) 
• Stakeholder management/ 
mapping for Policy Dialogue 
• Policy Dialogue Planning and 
Resource Mobilization 
(Austrian Development Agency 
2016; CARE 2019) 
Germany, 
Israel, 
Kenya 
Trilateral 
Tilapia 
Cooperation 
Trade and 
Value Chain 
of the Talpia 
Fish 
• Establishment of fishponds in 
Kenya accompanied with 
advice from Israel and 
Germany 
• Reduced pressure on fishing 
grounds and improved 
ecological balance of Lake 
Victoria 
• Improvement of the value 
chains to export talpia  
(Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
2014) 
Food and 
Agricultural 
Organization of 
the United 
Nations (FAO), 
Japan, CARD 
members 
including 
Kenya, 
Association 
of Southeast 
Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 
members 
Strengthening 
agricultural 
statistics and 
food security 
information in 
countries of the 
Coalition for 
African Rice 
Development 
(CARD) 
Agriculture  
and  
Data 
collection/ 
Research 
• Knowledge-sharing on 
surveying 
• Enhanced rice production 
statistics and data for 
concerned countries which can 
be used as impediments to the 
creation of effective policies  
(Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development 2016; Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 2020) 
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China, 
Netherlands, 
Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Uganda 
Dutch-Sino-
East African 
Bamboo 
Development 
Programme  
Poverty 
Reduction, 
Trade, 
Climate 
Change, 
Sustainable 
Development 
• Knowledge sharing on bamboo 
value chain development, 
product design, marketing and 
standardisation 
• Capacity-building of bamboo 
farms 
• Technology transfer 
• Unlocking the export potential 
of indigenous bamboo 
resources  
(International Bamboo and 
Rattan Organisation 2019) 
Indian National 
Institute of 
Agricultural 
Extension 
Management, 
Indian Ministry 
of Agriculture 
and Farmers' 
Welfare, USAID, 
Kenya, Liberia 
and Malawi 
Feed the 
Future India 
Triangular 
Training (FTF-
ITT) 
Programme 
Food 
Security, 
Climate 
Change, 
Education 
• Training of 1,400 agricultural 
professionals from 17 partner 
countries of Africa and Asia 
• Increase of knowledge on food 
and nutritional security based 
on lectures, group discussions, 
case studies and field visits, 
and pre- and post-training tests 
• Increase of knowledge on food 
and nutritional security through  
(Mittal 2020) 
DFID,  
The Energy and 
Resources 
Institute India 
(TERI), Kenya, 
Ethiopia 
DFID–TERI 
Partnership for 
Clean Energy 
Access and 
Improved 
Policies for 
Sustainable 
Development 
Clean 
Energy, 
Sustainable 
Development, 
Social 
Protection 
• Awareness work on clean 
energy products and services 
• Promotion of the use of clean 
cooking and lighting solutions 
to poor households 
• Installing solar lighting and 
cooking solutions in 40,000 
households  
(Mittal 2020) 
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Germany, 
China, FAO, 
Kenya 
Trilateral 
Cooperation on 
Carbon-Neutral 
Tea Value 
Chains 
(to start in 
2020) 
Trade and 
Value Chains, 
Climate 
Change and 
effects on 
agricultural 
productivity 
• Traditional tea planting and 
cropping and using traditional 
tea planting and cropping 
• Increase energy efficiency of 
tea factories to to save 
greenhouse gas emissions 
(Sino-German Center for 
Sustainable Development 
2019) 
Key findings from Kenya’s trilateral involvement 
Accumulation of similar thematic areas: Kenya is involved in various trilateral projects 
with different partners. The thematic focus of the projects are trade, agriculture and climate, 
research and technology, as well as training and people-to-people exchanges. While the 
projects are important contributions to sustainable development and Kenya’s vision 2030, 
the themes are highly concentrated on few overlapping areas. To realise Vision 2030, 
trilateral activities with Kenya and its partners need to be diversify to other sectors, including 
security, the stabilisation of the manufacturing sector, urbanisation infrastructure and health 
projects to address a cohesive, holistic and sustainable development for the Kenyan 
population. Moreover, governance capacity-building projects could be broadened for the 
Kenyan government to become a ‘democratic political system that is issue-based, people-
centred, result-oriented and accountable to the public’ (The National Treasury and Planning 
Kenya 2018: 99). 
Trilateral cooperation models shape the agenda: Kenya is involved in a variety of 
different trilateral cooperation structures, together with high-, middle- and low-income 
countries as well as international or regional organisations. Some projects involve the 
Kenyan government, while other projects involve civil society actors. Kenya’s trilateral 
activity is often compiled with other Eastern African countries (e.g. trilateral cooperation 
between Austria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). Who participates in the planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of trilateral cooperation shapes the agenda and 
outcomes of development. While national governments and international organisations are 
mostly involved in global trilateral projects, multi-stakeholder partnerships (e.g. the private 
sector, civil society and academia) can mobilise additional resources and generate 
innovative solutions. 
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Based on the key findings, the UK’s, China’s and Kenya’s expertise and Kenya’s Vision 
2030, the following section suggests new opportunities for trilateral cooperation. 
  
2.1.6 New opportunities and potential for innovation and scaling-up 
The bilateral cooperation between the UK and Kenya as well as China and Kenya contribute 
to a variety of sectors and strategies beneficial for tackling Kenya’s Big Four: manufacturing, 
universal healthcare, affordable housing and food security, and the ten foundations (see 
section 2.1.1). The following table provides suggestions for trilateral cooperation topics 
between the UK, China and Kenya. The topics are based on the expertise of the UK and 
China in certain sectors, the bilateral development focus of the UK and China in Kenya, and 
Kenya’s Vision 2030. Based on that, we see strategic linkages and possible complementary 
projects in the areas of trade, research, security, governance, urban infrastructure, 
renewable energy, agriculture, health and skills training. 
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Table 5: Potential opportunities for trilateral partnership 
Thematic areas Contribution to national 
development priorities 
Potential Partners Risks 
Trade and 
Research: 
Negotiating and 
intensifying 
research on the 
diversification 
and value-
addition of export 
products 
Macroeconomic stability, wealth 
creation and the possible 
extension of the Kenyan 
manufacturing sector 
 
To address the trade deficit with 
the UK, loss of exports to 
neighbouring countries, 
competition in agriculture and 
manufacturing, and dependence 
on agricultural products 
UK Department for International Trade; 
Ministry of Commerce China (MOFCOM).; 
Kenya-China Economic and Trade 
Association (KCETA); Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Cooperatives Kenya; British 
Chamber of Commerce Kenya; Kenyan 
Private Sector Alliance (based on the trilateral 
business MoU); Institute of Economic Affairs 
Kenya; Kenyan agriculture and manufacturing 
enterprises as target for value-addition; and 
Kenyan Investment Authority to stream ease 
of doing business to stimulate foreign 
investments 
Need to convince all parties of 
benefits of the project, as 
Kenyan products could be in 
direct competition with Chinese 
ones (plastics, machinery, 
transportation) in Kenya and 
neighbouring countries 
 
Diversification and value-
addition need protection 
mechanisms, capacity of all 
businesses, including SMEs 
and investments 
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Trade: 
Negotiations on 
lowering trade 
barriers (quality 
and safety of 
standards, import 
bans, trade 
facilitation 
measures) 
Macroeconomic stability and 
wealth creation 
 
To ease business to increase 
export revenues and to stimulate 
investments 
UK Department for International Trade; 
MOFCOM; KCTEA; Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Cooperatives Kenya; British 
Chamber of Commerce Kenya, and Kenyan 
Private Sector Alliance (based on the trilateral 
business MoU) 
 
 
The UK, China and Kenya 
have different trade standards 
and approaches 
 
A free trade agreement with 
China was negated by Kenya, 
trade agreements need to be 
based on trust and 
accountability between all 
partners (debts from the BRI 
might negatively affect this) 
Trade: 
Integrating Kenya 
into the global 
value chains in 
the 
manufacturing 
sector (cotton, 
fibre and leather 
products) 
Macroeconomic stability and 
wealth creation 
 
The UK and China can 
encourage firms to engage with 
the manufacturing sector to 
promote Kenya’s structural 
transformation 
• UK Department for International Trade; 
MOFCOM; Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Cooperatives Kenya; KCETA; British 
Chamber of Commerce Kenya; Kenyan 
Private Sector Alliance (based on the 
trilateral business MoU) 
• Suppliers: advertising firms in the UK, 
China and Kenya; and SMEs in the three 
countries 
Competition from other 
countries in cotton, fibre and 
leather products in terms of 
quality and price 
 
Trade barriers like tax 
measurements and import 
bans, quality and safety 
standards might hinder the 
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• Learning from trilateral cooperation on 
value chains (and the involvement of the 
Kenyan and Chinese government): 
• Trilateral Cooperation on Talpia and 
Carbon-Neutral Tea Value Chains 
successful integration into the 
global value chain 
Trade: 
Advancing Kenya 
as an outsourcing 
location in the 
ICT sector (Fildes 
2010, Muchiri 
2020) 
Macroeconomic stability, wealth 
creation, human resources 
development 
 
To raise productivity, human 
resource skills and create jobs 
(African Development Bank 
Group, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development and United 
Nations Development 
Programme 2014) 
UK Department for International Trade; 
MOFCOM; Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Cooperatives Kenya; KCETA; British 
Chamber of Commerce Kenya; Kenyan 
Private Sector Alliance (based on the trilateral 
business MoU); and British and Chinese 
companies, e.g. Huawei, and possibly widen 
the network to other economies like the US 
Persisting high energy costs, 
security issues and corporate 
challenges with corruption in 
Kenya 
 
Security: peace- 
keeping trainings 
and missions, 
Security, equity and wealth 
creation 
 
China-UK High Level Security Dialogue; 
British Army Training Unit Africa (experience 
in the peace support training in Kenya); UN 
Peacekeeping Mission through which the 
Security interventions can be 
seen as foreign interference, 
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expanding 
dialogue 
platforms 
Security issues in the East 
African region and Kenya 
persistent, Threats are linked to 
conflict, radicalisation and 
terrorism influencing economic 
and social security. Insecurity 
remains a trade barrier 
Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy 
operates in Africa; Mulitlateral organisations 
and national humanitarian development 
funding bodies; Kenya Defence Forces; and 
Kenyan Civil Society Organisations working 
on peace, e.g. PeaceNet Kenya 
but the UN can serve as a 
neutral partner 
 
China can provide assistance 
in less controversial areas, for 
example providing training on 
the use of ICT to track 
terrorism and violence, and the 
UK can share knowledge on 
legislation 
Governance: 
Anti-Corruption 
measurements  
Potential British and Chinese 
investors and companies are 
concerned about Kenya’s 
corruption, hindering FDI and 
trade opportunities. 
Corruption as trade barrier 
• DFID (and its experience in governance 
capacity-building), and China’s very own 
Anti-Corruption Campaign, e.g. with 
Chinese state-owned enterprises 
• Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), 
Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
& Analysis (KIPPRA) 
It is difficult for China and the 
UK to interfere in Kenya’s 
national politics and to hold the 
Sri Lankan government 
accountable for their promises 
Urban 
Infrastructure:   
Effective City 
Management for 
Affordable Housing (in a context 
of population growth and quick 
urbanisation) 
• Silk Road City Alliance 
• Knowledge-sharing with the Chinese 
government on its five-year plan on Green 
urban architecture, British researchers 
It is difficult to ensure 
infrastructure management in 
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affordable and 
green housing 
and companies on green infrastructure 
and innovative technologies (project: 
‘African cities of the future’) 
• Investments through the Belt and Road 
Green Investment and UK Climate 
Investments 
‘illegal’ slums, in which most of 
Kenya’s population lives 
 
Developing only some urban 
spaces might foster 
inequalities and conflict 
 
Ensuring sustainability and 
poverty reduction in connection 
to BRI loans and the Silk Road 
City Alliance might become 
another challenge reproducing 
inequality 
Clean Energy: 
Renewable 
energy for climate 
change 
adaptation and 
improved 
investments   
Energy and technology (High 
energy costs in Kenya hinder 
investments, Kenya is 
committed to a cleaner energy 
strategy (KNES)) 
Based on the KNES, the Ministry of Energy's 
Project Implementation Kenya, together with 
the Belt and Road Energy partnership (and 
Chinese SOB investing into the industrial 
supply chain for renewables) and businesses 
like the British M-Kopa 
High initial capital costs, low 
public awareness on 
renewable energy and its 
economic benefits (which 
might have been mitigated 
through the DFID-TERI 
partnership), lack of adherence 
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to system standards by 
suppliers 
Agriculture: 
Climate resilient 
agriculture for 
social protection, 
including 
pesticide 
alternatives 
Food security, enhanced equity 
and wealth creation 
opportunities (poverty is spatial 
and concentrated in the arid and 
semi-arid location) 
 
To add value on agricultural 
products, monitoring processes 
are necessary and relate to 
climate resilience and the use of 
pesticides 
Kenyan research institutions on agriculture 
(e.g. Kenya Agriculture and Livestock 
Research Organisation), involving Kenyan 
farmers and their knowledge; and British and 
Chinese researchers on agriculture to 
investigate climate resilience in the Kenyan 
context, investigating cheap pesticide 
alternatives (possibly from local Kenyan 
productions or indigenous methods) 
Most of Kenya’s lands are arid 
or semi-arid. Climate change 
consequences deeply 
influence livelihoods in Kenya. 
Loss in soil fertility drives 
climate migration, while many 
Somalians seek refuge in 
Kenya due to climate issues 
 
Quick, but thorough research 
and implementation methods 
are necessary. Efficient work 
distribution on data gathering 
and strong collaboration are 
the condition for the 
implementation 
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Capacity 
building: 
Enhance mutual 
understanding on  
national laws and 
working cultures 
Enhanced partnership building. 
 
Human resources development 
for a cohesive and diverse 
society in Kenya (lack of 
knowledge on local labour laws 
and the understanding for local 
staff creates disputes between 
mainly Chinese employers and 
local Kenyan employees) 
• In cooperation with Chinese and British 
companies based in Kenya 
• Knowledge sharing from workplace 
diversity in the UK e.g. with the The 
Employers Network for Equality & 
Inclusion 
• The Kenyan Central Organization of Trade 
Unions; the Federation of Kenyan 
Employers, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations of East Africa Trade Union 
(NGOEATU) to support cultural trainings. 
• Chinese investors to fund services for 
employees, possibly facilitated by the local 
subsidiaries of the trade unions 
Cultural understanding as a 
long-term process, Chinese 
‘debt-trap-policies' and 
previous negative experiences 
with Chinese employers 
created mistrust 
Health:  
for universal 
health care, 
service delivery 
Equitable, affordable and quality 
healthcare to all citizens 
according to Kenya’s 
constitution 
 
Scaling up maternal and child 
health, immunisation coverage, 
China’s BRI project for infrastructure 
investments, Fleming Fund; experience 
sharing from the UK on health systems; 
Ministry of Health Kenya; World Health 
Organization; Chinese health tech companies 
in communication with Kenya’s Trust for 
Indigenous Culture and Health (TICAH) 
Setbacks due to the lack of 
affordable medications, despite 
public awareness of health and 
diseases 
 
Divide between traditional and 
modern health supplier 
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prevention of non-communicable 
diseases particularly diabetes 
and hypertension, prevention of 
water borne, TB and HIV 
sexually transmitted diseases 
 
Needs to be complemented 
with health infrastructure, in 
particular in rural areas and for 
indigenous communities 
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2.2 Sri Lanka 
2.2.1 Sri Lanka’s national development priorities 
To understand Sri Lanka’s development trajectory, it is imperative to understand its political 
history. This chapter sets out the persistent challenges that Sri Lanka has faced: ethnic 
conflict leading to political instability and a long-running fiscal deficit. Then, the current 
administration’s national development vision is drawn upon. 
2.2.1.1 Development progress and challenges 
Political Instability 
The World Bank (2019b: np) classes Sri Lanka as a 'middle-income country’ that shows 
much promise despite a long-running civil war that only ended in 2009 and a tumultuous 
route toward post-conflict development. Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa presided over 
the end of the civil war period, but as Venugopal points out, Sri Lanka ‘is post-war, not post-
conflict’ (2018: 2). Focusing on economic development alone without conscious 
reconciliatory efforts inflamed prior ethnic tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese 
majority, leading to the democratic election of Sirisena (2015) who promised political 
stability, governmental reforms and constitutional amendments guaranteeing democracy.  
The political power in Sri Lanka has since then shifted back to the nationalist right with the 
Presidential election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. This has multi-fold implications for 
development in Sri Lanka: 
(i) Political instability can slow or contract economic growth (Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 2018); 
(ii) The Rajapaksa administration has recently withdrawn from the 2015 UN 
Resolution that indicated reformative intentions on Sri Lanka’s human rights 
record, as well as a commitment to reconciliation (The Associated Press 2020). 
This distances Sri Lanka from traditional development cooperation partners such 
as the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank as well as 
states like the UK; and 
(iii) The Rajapaksa government has been historically fiscally irresponsible when 
commissioning infrastructure projects, and may continue behaving so 
(Moramudali 2019a). 
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Trade and fiscal deficit 
A persistent economic problem that Sri Lanka has been facing since the 1970s relates to 
deficits in its fiscal budget (Dissanayake 2016) and trade (Jariya and Hassan 2018). The 
Asian Development Bank (Weerakoon, Kumar and Dime 2019) characterises Sri Lanka’s 
macroeconomy as volatile and vulnerable to recurrent balance of payments crisis. Both 
deficits limit the government’s ability to intervene in the market to improve export revenue or 
encourage domestic consumption and limits its ability to use fiscal policy as an economic 
tool. In the long run, Dissanayake (2016: 246) found that Sri Lankan budget deficits can also 
lead to inflation. The recurrent crises have led Sri Lanka to seek bailouts from banks such as 
the IMF (2019). 
A trade deficit contributes to Sri Lanka’s weak fiscal position. In terms of imports, Sri Lanka 
largely relies on India, China and the United Arab Emirates (COMTRADE n.d.). The US is 
Sri Lanka’s largest export market, followed by the UK and Sri Lanka (COMTRADE n.d.). The 
UK and China will prove valuable in helping Sri Lanka in improving its trade revenue.  
2.2.1.2 Sri Lanka’s national development vision 
Unlike some other countries, Sri Lanka does not have an official national development 
agenda. The most recent document that makes reference to Sri Lanka’s national 
development, the Report on Sustainable Sri Lanka 2030 Vision and Strategic Path was 
commissioned under the government of President Sirisena. Since then, Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa has been elected as Sri Lanka’s president. Despite the lack of an official 
document on development strategy, we found that Rajapaksa’s manifesto provided a strong 
basis of Sri Lanka’s national development basis. It was inappropriate to use any earlier 
document, particularly as many points and policies raised in Rajapaksa’s manifesto were 
precisely in opposition to that of the previous administration’s.  
Sri Lanka’s national development vision announced by President Rajapaksa prioritises 
national security, aiming ‘to create a productive citizen, a happy family, a disciplined society 
and a prosperous nation’ (Rajapaksa 2020: np).  
Table 6: Sri Lanka's national development priorities 
Priorities Future pathways and strategies 
National Security  ● Strong working links with foreign agencies, opportunities to train 
locally and abroad, ICT equipment and training for personnel 
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● Legal protection, housing and welfare concessions for personnel 
● Life-long salaries for disabled soldiers 
● Ensuring transparency and meritocratic advancement 
● Increased training and recruitment 
● Upgrading technology to reduce drug trafficking; creation of 
rehabilitation programmes 
Friendly, Non-
Aligned Foreign 
Policy 
● Ensure national ownership of strategic assets and economically 
important natural resources 
● Work with all friendly nations on equal terms 
● Focus on reciprocal commercial ties and trade relationships with 
Asia 
● Work on regional security with neighbours 
● Acknowledge the standing of developed countries in commerce and 
trade 
● Enhance trade relationships with the Middle East, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore 
An Administration 
Free From 
Corruption 
● Delivering justice on the Central Bank Bond scam and 20 other 
major financial crimes 
● Punitive measures for corrupt officials including expulsion from the 
party and judicial procedures 
● Online procurement system for all public investments and 
expenditure, determination of taxes, awarding of contracts, etc.  
● Using technology to eliminate corruption 
● To make state-owned enterprises profitable and financially 
independent. Eradicate all forms of malpractices and corruption. 
Appointments to be based on merit. Mandatory requirement of 
forensic audits 
A New 
Constitution that 
Fulfills the Wishes 
of the People 
● A Parliamentary Select Committee will be appointed to engage with 
the people, political leaders and civil society groups to prepare a 
new constitution 
● Appointment of officials on a basis of merit 
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● Increase bureaucratic efficiency by removing red tape. Restructuring 
cabinet ministers to meet the SDGs 
● Establishment of an Inter-Religious Advisory Council to prevent 
minor tensions between religious and ethnic groups from growing 
● Establishment of a National Land Commission to prepare a proper 
land use policy 
● Bridging the communication gap by making it compulsory for 
Sinhalese students to learn Tamil and vice versa 
● Legislation to curb election related expenditure 
A Productive 
Citzenry and 
Vibrant Human 
Resource 
● Areas of focus: health, youth, women, differently abled and disabled, 
elderly 
● Culture of Working for the Country 
● Provide adequate and affordable housing. Continue the urban 
regeneration programme and extend it to rural communities  
People Centric 
Economic 
Development 
● Macroeconomic targets: average economic growth of at least 6.5 per 
cent per capita income of more than US$6,500, unemployment rate 
of less than 4 per cent, single digit interest rate, stable exchange 
rate 
● Manage foreign indebtedness by promoting domestic investments, 
reducing import expenditure and raising export incomes. Eliminate 
all unnecessary government expenditures, develop the economy 
through domestic resource-based exports and import substitution. 
Encourage social enterprise 
● Develop agriculture, fisheries, milk, chicken and egg, tourism, 
apparel and construction sectors 
● Implement the Business Revival Programme 
● Increase domestic production of sugar for self-sufficiency 
● Expanding and depoliticising cooperatives 
Technology 
Based Society 
● Maximise the use of the Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence, 
Biotechnology, Robotics, Augmented Reality, Cloud Computing, 
Nanotechnology and 3D Printing 
   
 
 51 
● Mobile and digital payment systems (local and international) 
● New legislation for data protection, cybersecurity and intellectual 
property rights 
● Encourage IT entrepreneurship 
● Obtaining public services via the Internet 
● Digital monitoring and administrative centres 
Development of 
Physical 
Resources 
● Bridge the urban-rural divide by providing services and infrastructure 
facilities equally. Integrate all major cities, townships and business 
zones for agro industrialisation and to create better links for the 
tourism sector 
● Develop a Light Rail Transit system and a Metro Rail system to link 
satellite cities in Colombo; ensure bus transport system complies 
with Green Transport; and complete unfinished roadworks and 
feasibility studies 
● Upgrade Port of Colombo to double capacity; develop revisit 
Hambantota port arrangements with the Chinese; and develop 
airports 
● Move towards renewable energy; provide clean and safe drinking 
water; reduce elephant-human conflict and improve disaster warning 
systems 
Sustainable 
Environmental 
Management 
● Sustainable agriculture, animal husbandry through the introduction 
of scientific methods 
● Circular economy to be promoted (Re-use, Recycle, Re-purpose) 
● Minimise waste, improve waste management and introduce 
sustainable consumption to children 
● Increase national forest cover by 30 per cent 
● Large scale developments will not be allowed to be identified in 
environmentally sensitive areas 
● Education programmes to increase awareness and to engage with 
communities 
Disciplined, Law ● Buddhism first and foremost, but in coexistence with other religions 
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Abiding and 
Values Based 
Society 
● Rule of law is not to be challenged, but to be protected by the 
government 
● Freedom of speech and publication 
● Conservation of historical heritage 
● Social protection and welfare to address social inequality 
 
While there is potential for Sri Lanka to attain the vision set out in Rajapaksa’s manifesto, the 
same structural problems persist. Firstly, any economic development will hinge upon the 
government’s ability to maintain political stability. The constitutional crisis in 2018, for 
example, led to a slowed growth of 3.2 per cent (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2018: np). 
Secondly, as the new government has pointed out, Sri Lanka has to grapple with its fiscal 
deficit while making productive investments that will better its fiscal position in the long run 
(Rajapaksa 2019: 36). 
2.2.2 The UK in Sri Lanka 
In this section, we explore Sri Lanka and the UK’s relationship. We highlight their political 
and economic relations and posit that future relations will be dependent on the political will 
(or lack thereof) of the Sri Lankan government to uphold human rights as well as the UK’s 
perceived economic interest in the country post-Brexit. 
2.2.2.1 Political relations 
Sri Lanka and the UK share a colonial history: in 1815, the British managed to control almost 
all of Sri Lanka, then named Ceylon, and Sri Lanka gained independence only in 1948 
(Kandaudahewa 2015: 54). As Ratnapalan posits,  
‘the public face of British decolonization with respect to independent South Asia… was 
one of modernisation and partnership. The Commonwealth… was reconceptualized as 
“a world-wide experiment in nation building” against the backdrop of communism 
expanding its reach.’ 
Ratnapalan (2016: 544) 
The strategic compromise between Britain’s then post-war strategy and Ceylon’s then 
leaders’ need to attain independence meant that Ceylon maintained friendly relations with 
the UK. In April 1985, then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher inaugurated Victoria 
Dam, which cost US$145.38 million in British grant aid (DFID 2004: 1). While DFID closed its 
bilateral programme with Sri Lanka in 2006 when Sri Lanka became a middle-income 
   
 
 53 
country, it still contributes to the Conflict Prevention Fund in Sri Lanka amounting to about 
US$2.57 million (DFID n.d.b). 
2.2.2.2 Economic relations 
Trade 
As the UK navigates Brexit, it is particularly important for Sri Lanka to maintain trade 
relations with the UK, due to its healthy trade surplus (Ward 2020: 10). The UK is also one of 
the top five countries that Sri Lanka has a positive balance of trade with (Department of 
Commerce 2017: 10). While Sri Lankan exports to the UK have fallen slightly from 
US$1,077.18 million in 2013 to US$1035.14 million in 2017 (Department of Commerce 2017: 
12), over 30 per cent of Sri Lankan exports to the European Union (EU) market goes to the 
UK (Razzaque, Vickers and Goel 2016: 5). In total, the UK accounts for 9.8 per cent of Sri 
Lanka’s exports (Razzaque, Vickers and Goel 2016: 3). The EU is a comparatively larger 
market, coming in after India as Sri Lanka’s second-largest trading partner (European 
Commission 2019a). As the UK and the EU work out the terms of Brexit, there are 
opportunities for the Sri Lankan government to improve trade relations with both the UK and 
the EU. Under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), Sri Lanka’s 
exports were granted greater access to the EU market in 2017, on the condition that ‘Sri 
Lanka…[advances] human and labour rights and…[works] towards sustainable 
development’ (European Commission 2019a: np). Prospects of the Sri Lanka’s eligibility in 
the scheme are bleak after its recent withdrawal from the 2015 UN Resolution that 
demonstrated its commitment to promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights 
(OHCHR 2014). Even without the political turn of events, it is important for Sri Lanka to 
negotiate its trade position with both the EU and the UK in the long-term as the country will 
not be eligible for the GSP+ once the World Bank (n.d.) classifies it as an upper middle-
income country. 
The success of Sri Lanka’s apparel industry - Sri Lanka’s exports to the EU and the UK 
are dominated by its textiles and clothing industry, accounting for 82 per cent of total exports 
to the EU in 2016 (European Commission 2019a). The apparel industry is Sri Lanka’s 
‘principal manufacturing industry… [that brings] in 43 percent [sic] of the country’s total 
export earnings’ (Rajapaksa 2019: 35). The Sri Lankan government has laid out plans to 
carry out tax reforms and to allocate ‘200 acres of land… for the development of a garments 
town’ (Rajapaksa 2019: 45). The Sri Lankan apparel industry has proved resilient following 
the termination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 2005, carving out a niche market for itself 
by attracting specialty international firms such as Victoria’s Secret, Marks and Spencer, 
   
 
 54 
Sainsbury’s and Tesco, among others, that focused on large variety and small scale orders 
which were compatible with the small-scale operations of Sri Lankan firms (Athukorala and 
Ekanayake 2017). In particular, Athukorala and Ekanayake (2017) have identified a shift 
towards high-end niche products such as lingerie, panties and fashion-basis casualwear. For 
the Sri Lankan apparel industry to remain competitive, the government has to keep adding 
value to its exports. One factor was Sri Lanka’s regulations on the labour market that 
allowed the industry to align itself with ethical trade norms internationally: ‘minimum wage 
legislation, restrictions on labour retrenchment, severance payments… trade union activism’ 
and signing up to the ILO Core Conventions were pivotal moments that made Sri Lanka’s 
apparel workers more attractive (ibid: 4). The highly skilled and educated workforce in Sri 
Lanka also lent itself to quicker upskilling and workplace mobility than other countries and 
skilled workers are in demand from other countries’ apparel industries though it now faces 
competition from Asia (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson 2016).  
Sri Lanka can strengthen its export position in relation to the UK and the EU by continuing to 
invest in human resource development and training in technology and innovation (Bruce 
2013). Research projects such as Bruce’s present ways in which private firms in the textile 
and apparel industries, government and academic institution stakeholder groups can work 
together in informal associations that ensure that the model of cooperation is flexible, 
appropriately skilled for the job market and regulated at suitable scales (ibid). As long as the 
Brexit transitions result in a politically stable UK, Sri Lanka can capitalise on its current 
comparative advantages in the textile and apparel industry to seek a more favourable 
balance of payment. 
Foreign direct investment 
UK-Sri Lankan engagements on FDI have largely been led by private firms and Sri Lanka. 
Recent efforts include the Invest Sri Lanka Forum organised in London by the Colombo 
Stock Exchange in association with the Sri Lanka High Commission in UK and Bloomberg 
(Invest Sri Lanka - CSE 2018) as well as the Investment and Trade Opportunities in Sri 
Lanka event, and a roundtable networking lunch hosted by the Sri Lankan High Commission 
in London to reach out to Sri Lankan diaspora in the UK (Admingajaba 2019a). There have 
been higher level discussions as the UK prepares for Brexit such as the meeting between 
the UK Secretary of State for International Trade Liam Fox and the High Commissioner of 
Sri Lanka in the UK Manisha Gunasekera (Admingajaba 2019b). In Fox’s speech at the UK 
Trade and Export Finance Forum (2019), he used Sri Lanka as a successful example of the 
UK’s Global Britain strategy post-Brexit in infrastructure building. As the sole project 
amounts to US$61.62 million directed toward building bridges in rural communities in Sri 
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Lanka, the UK’s contributions pales in insignificance in comparison to China’s. In 2014, the 
UK was the second largest source of FDI (Deyshappriya 2017) but by 2018, Sri Lanka’s 
largest investors were China, Hong Kong, India and Singapore (Santander 2019). The lack 
of political direction in terms of increasing UK foreign direct investment can be partially 
explained by the following significant political events. Firstly, the UK is wary of pursuing 
close political relationships with Sri Lanka after the Mahinda administration has been 
accused of refusing to address human rights violations during its longstanding civil war. 
While the UK may hope to pursue closer economic ties with Sri Lanka post-Brexit, Sri 
Lanka’s recent withdrawal from the 2015 UN Resolution, which committed the country to 
investigations of alleged war crimes during the civil war (The Associated Press 2020), will 
likely force the UK to distance itself from Sri Lanka. Secondly, after the 2011 scandal in 
which UK Conservative MP Liam Fox was forced to quit over close connections with Sri 
Lanka and nepotist behaviour (Burke 2011), the UK government has had to manage its 
public image cautiously. The type of cooperation UK can offer Sri Lanka will be limited but 
there is much potential considering UK’s large volume of investment up to 2014. 
2.2.2.3 Development assistance 
Development assistance from the UK to Sri Lanka is small in comparison to other lower 
income countries. Active projects in Sri Lanka revolve around the themes of sustainable 
development, health, education and conflict. We review ongoing projects in Sri Lanka and 
examine areas in which cooperation can be deepened to support Sri Lanka’s national 
development goals. 
Table 7: Current UK projects active in Sri Lanka 
 
UK 
Department/Agency 
Projects/Programmes 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Avoiding Deforestation, Managing Critical Ecosystems and 
Increasing Resilience to Climate Change in Sri Lanka 
Ecosystem Conservation and Management Project Additional 
Financing 
Darwin Initiative Round 24 
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Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
British Council 
Chevening Scholarships 
Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules-based 
International System in Sri Lanka 
Frontline Diplomatic Enabling Activity in Sri Lanka 
Countering Proliferation in Sri Lanka 
Department of Health 
and Social Care 
Fleming Fund—Country and Regional Grants and Fellowships 
Programme 
Conflict, Stability and 
Security Fund and 
Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
Delivering increased stability and reducing the risk of a return to 
conflict. Mainly clearing land of mines and other unexploded 
weapons (FCO 2018: 23) 
(DFID n.d.b) 
Bilateral aid between the UK and Sri Lanka has not been unconditional either. As hostilities 
escalated between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam, an 
armed group seeking an independent state, escalated during a ceasefire agreement, the ‘UK 
suspended US$3 million of debt relief’ (Wheeler et al. 2012: 2). The changing political 
situations in both the UK and Sri Lanka will also alter the dynamics of bilateral relations. The 
OHCHR’s Investigation Report on Sri Lanka in 2015 revealed human rights abuses and 
crimes by the government of Sri Lanka during the conflict with the Liberation Tigers Tamil 
Eelam. The UN Resolution ‘Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in 
Sri Lanka’ was adopted, with 23 countries in favour including the UK (OHCHR 2014). As part 
of its core foreign policy, the UK stated its position that ‘trade is important not only to the 
prosperity of the UK but to Sri Lanka… However, the UK’s commitment to free trade goes 
hand in hand with… [their] commitment to human rights’ (House of Lords Hansard 2014: np). 
While the 2015 report submitted to the Human Rights Council recognised that the report was 
mandated under the leadership of Mahinda Rajapaksa and submitted in relation to the 
Sirisena government, which promised judicial reforms centred on good governance and 
human rights (OHCHRRights 2014: 3), the current political leadership has once again shifted 
back to the Rajapaksa family since late 2019. In early 2020, the Sri Lankan government 
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withdrew its co-sponsorship of the 2015 UN Resolution (The Associated Press 2020). In the 
UK, the recent news indicated a foreseeable merger between DFID and the FCO (Worley 
2020). This implies that UK’s interest in Sri Lanka may move even further away from 
development assistance. 
Other than projects in less contested areas such as education, health and sustainable 
environmental management, the UK’s development projects in Sri Lanka are geared strongly 
toward conflict prevention and reconciliation. Notably, the contested nature of the citizenship 
of Tamil nationals in Sri Lanka originated from the fact that the British colonial government 
created class differentials by prioritising English-educated (mainly Tamil) elites over 
Sinhalese-educated Sri Lankan nationals (World Bank 2003). As UK’s development projects 
are already not geared toward overseas development aid in Sri Lanka with the exception of 
conflict prevention, there seems to be a foreseeable continuity in the near future.  
Education - Educational exchanges between Sri Lanka and the UK take place in several 
forms. The British Council supports the Sri Lankan education sector through projects like 
TRANSFORM, sharing expertise and focusing on professionalisation, quality assurance and 
helping young people transition into employment; the promotion of the English language and 
best teaching practices; and improving access to education (British Council 2020). The 
British Council has also worked with the government of Sri Lanka in the above priority 
research areas in education (ibid). Additionally, initiatives such as the Chevening 
Scholarships identify future leaders for further education in the UK (Chevening 2019). The 
Sri Lankan has also recognised the low institutional capacities of universities in the country, 
seeking to make infrastructural investments ‘to increase the intake of students’ (Rajapaksa 
2019: 21). In 2013, Sri Lanka only admitted 23,000 out of 223,000 students who sat for 
university entrance exams; 12,000 students went abroad for university in the same year 
(D’Souza and Moore 2017). For overseas Sri Lankan university candidates, the UK is the 
third most popular option (ibid). As the Sri Lankan government seeks to expand institutional 
capacities in the education sector to prepare for an increased intake of students, the 
government can leverage on education partnerships with the UK, to apply the expertise and 
experience of the UK in training teachers and designing institutions. 
Health - Health in the form of human capital development also features in Rajapaksa’s 
vision for Sri Lanka. Projects that foster research and educational partnerships between the 
UK and Sri Lanka can help build capacity in terms of healthcare resources (Dissanayake et 
al 2006). For example, a project funded by the World Diabetes Foundation, the NHS and 
various health institutions in Sri Lanka helped create training and research links, as well as 
support Sri Lankan researchers ‘in developing and writing project proposals and in securing 
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funding’ to great success (Dissanayake et al 2006: 351). The Fleming Fund is another 
programme that helps low- and middle-income nations, including Sri Lanka, ‘fight 
antimicrobial resistance’ by encouraging the collection of data that can inform policies and 
practices (Fleming Fund 2018). Similar to the UK, Sri Lanka also has a universal healthcare 
system. In this regard, both systems face large patient numbers and long waiting lists. The 
UK and Sri Lanka can seek partnerships and knowledge sharing platforms to share their 
experiences so as to make both healthcare systems more efficient. 
Sustainable development - The UK’s interest in conservation of the environment is tied to 
the nation’s commitment to the its own 25 Year Environment Plan. In Round 24, the Darwin 
initiative funded the project ‘Livelihoods Insurance from Elephants in Kenya and Sri Lanka’ 
(Darwin Initiative 2015: np), which helps Sri Lanka governments ‘insure small-scale women 
and men farmers for damage caused by human-wildlife conflict, primarily from elephants’ 
(Steele et al. 2019: 2). While the project is still ongoing, there are promises that it can 
contribute to Sri Lanka’s vision of sustainable development and UK’s aim of reducing the 
future risk of conflict in Sri Lanka. The program aims to target the ‘North-central and North-
western Province’ and ‘at least 10% female headed households’ (Steele et al. 2019: 2), 
which are the poorest and most vulnerable group in Sri Lanka. This project is a form of social 
protection that complements the Sri Lanka government’s social protection policies by 
increasing rural incomes. It also supplements the Sri Lankan vision to conserve 
environmental biodiversity by reducing the killing of elephants in the event of conflicts with 
humans. Eventually, the aim of the project is to convince the Sri Lankan government to roll 
out a national insurance scheme. 
The World Bank-managed project on Ecosystem Conservation and Management funded by 
the UK also aims to reduce human-elephant conflict and is providing support for the Darwin 
initiative. However, it also has the broader remit of ‘strengthening environmental protection 
by enhancing environmental governance, safeguarding natural habitats and biodiversity and 
restoring critically damaged ecosystems in ways that contribute to conservation, poverty 
alleviation and environmental sustainability’ (World Bank 2009: 2). Primarily, the project will 
provide technical support to the Sri Lankan government on identifying critically important 
biodiversity hotspots and turning them into protected areas, capacity building of resource 
persons and improvements to infrastructure, develop nature-based tourism within protected 
areas and mainstreaming environmental concerns into Sri Lanka’s development plans 
(World Bank 2009). The Sri Lankan government can potentially leverage the project to not 
only help implement its sustainable environment policy, but also capitalise on the knowledge 
created in the project to help boost the tourism industry, particularly in protected areas, and 
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generate income for rural families. This will also bring it toward more inclusive economic 
growth and reduce social, urban-rural inequality. 
This section presented the political and economic relations between the UK and Sri Lanka. 
While we emphasised the uncertainty belying future cooperation due to the political and 
economic developments in both countries, we anticipate there to be opportunities that the 
two countries can capitalise upon. 
2.2.3 China and Sri Lanka 
China and Sri Lanka’s bilateral relations date back over 20 centuries to the Ming Dynasty, 
when Chinese navigator Zheng He sailed to Sri Lanka for trade and cultural exchanges 
(Kelegama 2014: 132). Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to recognise and support the 
People’s Republic of China (Wang and Ye 2019: 483). Economic relations between the two 
countries deepened in recent years. Former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
signed eight bilateral agreements and Memorandums of Understanding with the Chinese 
government in a landmark visit in 2007 (Kelegema 2014). Between 2003 and 2016, 
Deyshappriya (2019: 367) accounted for at least 35 high profile meetings between Sri Lanka 
and China. 
2.2.3.1 Political relations 
There is a political aspect to contemporary China and Sri Lanka’s relations. When the Sri 
Lankan government was accused of human rights violations by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam at the UN, China supported the Sri Lankan government and later even provided 
military arms (Wang and Ye 2014: 485). The dynamism of China-Sri Lankan relations are 
also largely dependent on domestic Sri Lankan politics. Sirisena’s successful election in 
2015 against then incumbent Mahinda Rajapska was partly based on a criticism on the 
Colombo Port City Project (Wang and Ye 2014: 490). Sri Lanka was warm to Chinese 
investment under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapska, particularly in large 
infrastructure projects. The Hambantota port financed by China’s Export-Import Bank caused 
much international furore and raised national concerns over Sri Lanka’s independence. Due 
to a persistent balance of payments deficit, the Sri Lankan government under the leadership 
of Sirisena faced a crisis as it struggled to service upcoming debt payments ‘due to the 
maturity of international sovereign bonds’ and chose to lease out the Hambantota port to 
China Merchant Port Holdings Limited for 99 years for US$1.12 billion (Moramudali 2019a: 
np). International media such as The New York Times termed Xi’s BRI a ‘debt trap for 
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vulnerable countries around the world, fuelling corruption and autocratic behaviour in 
struggling democracies’ (Abi-Habib 2018: np). 
No matter what China’s intentions are, how Sri Lankans view China will have an impact on 
future bilateral relations. When the Rajapska brothers came into power late last year due to 
their strong stance on national security and domestic political stability, Gotabaya’s manifesto 
demonstrates an awareness of concerns over Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. In particular, the 
policy direction to have a ‘friendly and non-aligned foreign policy’ reassures Sri Lankans that 
the government ‘will be mindful of…national sovereignty… [and] ensure that ownership of 
strategic assets and economically important national resources are not transferred to any 
foreign country’ (Rajapaksa 2019: 15). This means that while the Rajapaksa brothers are 
back in power, we can anticipate more moderate relations with China than when they were 
last in power. 
2.2.3.2 Economic relations 
China and Sri Lanka have enjoyed dynamic economic relations, with cooperation deepening 
in areas of trade, investments, infrastructure building via the Belt and Road Initiative, and 
tourism. We explore the four aspects and explore how cooperation can be deepened in the 
South-South model. 
Table 8: Overview of formal agreements between Sri Lanka and China 
Parties Agreement Purpose 
Bangladesh, China, India, 
Republic of Korea, Laos 
and Sri Lanka 
 Asia Pacific Trade Agreement Preferential 
Exports 
Sri Lanka and China MoU on customs cooperation Ease of trade 
and investments 
MoU on quarantine cooperation 
MoU on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(prelude to setting up of FTA) 
Sri Lanka-China Joint Committee for Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
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Sri Lanka-China Business Cooperation 
Council 
Sri Lanka, along with 20 
other states were invited to 
be founding members 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank  Improving 
connectivity, 
investment in 
infrastructure 
projects 
(The Embassy of Sri Lanka in the People’s Republic of China 2019) 
Other than the above formal agreements between Sri Lanka and China, the two countries 
have also attempted to enhance trade relations through negotiations on a possible FTA. 
While the two states have not been able to come to an agreement, Sri Lanka has much to 
gain from securing a FTA with China. A 2014 report commissioned found that Sri Lanka will 
gain 542 potential exports to China under the new FTA, creating new market opportunities 
(Wijayasiri et al. 2014: 6). Even without a FTA in place, trade relations have deepened over 
the years. In 2016, China surpassed India momentarily to become Sri Lanka’s largest import 
source (Moramudali 2019b). 
Trade 
Currently, there exist several formal agreements between Sri Lanka and China set up to 
enhance trade and investment in Sri Lanka. China is an important trade partner of Sri Lanka, 
and Chinese imports can potentially help Sri Lanka overcome its balance of payments deficit 
in the long run. 
Overall, the total trade turnover has increased over four-fold from US$965.81 million in 2007 
to US$4,606.36 million in 2017 (The Embassy of Sri Lanka in the People’s Republic of China 
2019). However, the balance of trade is strongly in China’s favour, with Sri Lanka suffering 
an expanding trade deficit from -US$894.57 million to -US$3,776.08 million in the same 
decade. 
Sri Lanka’s trade deficit can be explained by an increase in Chinese imports, and also a slow 
growth in its export market. China’s trade deficit with Sri Lanka accounts for 26.4 per cent of 
Sri Lanka’s total trade deficit, in comparison to India’s 27.3 per cent in 2014 (Deyshappriya 
2019: 371). However, as Kelegama (2014) points out, Sri Lanka’s increasing trade deficit 
with China is not necessarily a negative impact. Sri Lanka’s major imports from China 
include: light vessels; petroleum  products; automatic data processing machines; cotton; 
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knitted or crocheted fabric; man-made  staple fibres; textiles; vehicles  and  parts; mineral 
and chemical fertilisers; and plastic products (The Embassy of Sri Lanka in the Republic of 
China 2019). Many of these imports are primary inputs in Sri Lanka’s export market, 
primarily in the textiles and garment industry (Deyshappriya 2019: 389). Recent import 
growth can also be explained by the growth of imports in electronics and durable consumer 
products that Sri Lanka does not have a comparative advantage in producing (Deyshappriya 
2019: 372). In comparison, China is not an important export destination for Sri Lanka, 
despite attempts by the Export Development Board to increase exports to China (Sri Lanka 
Export Development Board 2018). 
Currently, Sri Lanka is attempting to improve its export volume to China through the 
following measures: 
● The Sri Lankan Export Development Board has recruited an international 
consultancy to better match Sri Lankan exports to Chinese traders (Sri Lanka 
Export Development Board 2018); 
● Developing high technology agriculture through subsidies, loans, land 
reformations and the introduction of a product quality inspection system and 
geographical information certificates recognised internationally (Rajapaksa 
2019); and 
● Reforming the tax system for the apparel industry (Rajapaksa 2019: 38). 
The Export Development Board has also identified ‘apparel, solid or retreaded tyres, tea, 
coconut fibre, natural rubber, cinnamon, coconuts, fruits, nuts, edible plants preserved with 
sugar, pepper, frozen fish, excluding fillets and gloves’ as products with the greatest export 
potential, but laments the ‘miscommunication and lack of negotiation skills of Sri Lankan 
SMEs’ (Sri Lanka Export Development Board 2018: np).  
Foreign direct investment, loans and grants 
China is also one of Sri Lanka’s largest source of FDI and government debt. According to 
the IMF (2019: 10), official Chinese loans to the Sri Lankan government amounted to 
approximately US$3 billion at the end of 2018; about 9 per cent of Sri Lanka’s external 
government debt. In comparison, Sri Lanka owes 13 per cent of its debt to the Asian 
Development Bank, 10 per cent to Japan and 10 per cent to the World Bank (IMF 2019: 10). 
In terms of volume, China has been the largest FDI source since 2012 (Deyshappriya 2017: 
np). The private sector initiative, the Sri Lanka-Chinese Business Cooperation Council, has 
actively directed Chinese investment to Sri Lanka by holding fairs and ‘events such as the 
Kunming Trade Fair in 2011 and 2013, and How to do Business in China’ seminars 
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(Deyshappriya 2017: np). Additionally, the Sri Lankan government has initiated a scheme in 
which Chinese investors can obtain a ‘Second Home’ passport if they ‘invest at least US$25 
million’ (Fernando in Deyshappriya 2019: 374). 
Chinese FDI in Sri Lanka has been ‘directed mostly towards infrastructure development 
including transportation and power and energy’ (Deyshappriya 2017: np). This can 
potentially be aligned with President Gotabaya Rajapska’s vision of developing a ‘people-
centric economy’ (2019: 36). More specifically, better infrastructure for transport can help 
strengthen agriculture exports, improve urban-rural connectivity and position Colombo as a 
global financial, investment and banking hub. Physical infrastructure will also be key in 
protecting vulnerable populations from the effects of climate change, deliver judicial 
processes, maintain religious sites and delivering social protection. President Gotabaya 
Rajapska’s manifesto mentions infrastructure 21 times, illustrating the importance of 
infrastructure development for Sri Lanka’s national development. In 2017, Chinese official 
development assistance to, and FDI in, Sri Lanka totalled to over US$14 billion. The concept 
of connectivity in China’s BRI synchronises with Sri Lanka’s strategic position in the Indian 
Ocean: major port projects, international airports as well as road and rail networks have 
been planned to be connected to Special Economic Zones that will ‘transform Sri Lanka into 
a shipping, aviation and a logistics hub’ (Arif and Rafique 2017: 4-5). 
The BRI is an integral part of the economic relations between Sri Lanka and China. The BRI 
envisions two routes: one on land between China and Europe via Russia and the other 
maritime route links China to Southeast Asian countries and beyond (The State Council 
2015). Other than the US$8 billion in financing through the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank had also proposed funding of up to US$32 billion for further infrastructure 
projects in Sri Lanka (Wijayasiri and Senaratne 2018: 387). Notable BRI projects include the 
Colombo International Financial City, the Hambanota Port, the Colombo Port Expansion and 
the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport. Considering Sri Lanka’s infrastructure gap, the 
BRI has the potential to bring about much socio-economic development in Sri Lanka by 
increasing connectivity within the nation, and also between the nation and its neighbours 
(Wijayasiri and Seratne 2018: 387-389). 
However, even as these infrastructural projects hold promise for Sri Lanka’s development, it 
remains crucial that the Sri Lankan government can take advantage of these investments by 
providing an attractive investor climate, strengthening its export value and improving 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, prudent fiscal decisions need to be made going 
forward. While the majority of the loans for the Hambantota port project were concessionary, 
poor governmental decisions to construct the port despite ‘persistent fiscal and current 
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account deficits’ led the government to lease out the port (Moramudali 2020: np). Sri Lanka’s 
government made the choice to pay off debts that were due to its non-Chinese creditors - its 
Chinese loans were not due for repayment yet.  
Another factor to consider would be the need to manage mega-projects and to make 
measured decisions about their locations: they may not immediately be profit-making, if at all 
(Moramudali 2020). The Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport has been named the 
World’s Emptiest International Airport; the white elephant project (Shepard 2016). White 
elephant projects refer to ‘projects that are politically motivated and economically 
unsustainable’ (Parks 2018: np). Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa made a decision to 
build a transport hub in Mattalla, his hometown, but the location of the airport and lack of 
commercial infrastructure meant that the project ultimately failed to reach its ambitions 
(Shepard 2016). 
For inclusive, sustainable growth, infrastructural projects will also need to consider the 
possible environmental and social impacts. For instance, locals have complained that there 
has been a lack of public consultation and transparency in infrastructural deals between Sri 
Lanka and China. Villagers have been protesting against the 15,000-acre investment zone in 
Beragama that was to be handed over to the Chinese, of which villagers viewed to be the 
most fertile (Perera 2018). Environmental assessment reports have also claimed that the 
highway linking the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport and the Hambantota port ‘cuts 
through key elephant corridors’, with ‘between 15-20% of the island’s elephant population’ 
living in the area (ibid). Protestors are worried about the effects of land reclamation projects, 
such as ‘coastal erosion, landslide threats, noise and air pollution’ (ibid). From the Chinese 
perspective, however, these struggles were ‘principally a reflection of the political struggles 
in Sri Lanka’ (Wang and Ye 2019: 493). The general manager of China Harbour Engineering 
Co., Ltd (CHEC), Zhang Xiaoqiang, on the subject of environmental impact assessments 
(EIA) in the Colombo Port City Project, reflected that: 
(i) The EIA is the responsibility of the Sri Lankan government; 
(ii) the approval authority of the EIA belongs to its Ministry of Coastal Resources; 
and 
(iii) the Sri Lankan government should complete all the EIA before handing it over to 
CHEC. 
i. The government had already handed over all the EIA certificates to 
CHEC and notified them in writing that the relevant formalities were 
clear and complete. 
(in Wang and Ye 2019: 493) 
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What this reflects is that there needs to be clear chains of responsibility and accountability, 
with relevant documents made available to all stakeholders and the public, so as to avoid 
misunderstanding. Official communications such as strategic meetings and dialogue need to 
be held periodically and documented. Less official means of communication should also be 
encouraged, so as to facilitate mutual understanding.  
While China is the largest foreign direct investor in Sri Lanka, Chinese FDI in Sri Lanka only 
amounts to 0.10 per cent of China’s GDP. Comparatively, other South Asian countries such 
as Afghanistan and the Maldives had stocks worth 2.36 per cent and 0.48 per cent of GDP 
respectively (Deyshappriya 2017: np). There is greater potential for Sri Lanka to attract a 
greater proportion of Chinese FDI. Although China views investment in infrastructural 
development to be the way forward for economic development, the implementation of these 
development projects will depend largely on Sri Lankan domestic politics. 
Tourism 
The government of Sri Lanka views tourism to be a pivotal sector in driving Sri Lanka’s 
national development. It will be attempting to build ‘a tourism development programme with 
the intention of increasing annual tourist arrivals to 7 million people… [and] to annually add a 
foreign exchange inflow of USD 10 billion to the domestic economy’ (Rajapaksa 2019: 44). 
The Chinese market is important to the Sri Lankan economy: in 2018, China was the second 
largest source of tourists with a share of 11.3 per cent and 265,965 arrivals (Sri Lanka 
Tourism Development Authority 2018: 21). Chinese tourists were also the largest spenders 
by far, spending US$277.3 billion, trailed by US visitors who spent US$144.2 billion. The Sri 
Lankan government has launched measures such as free visas on arrival and the reduction 
of airport taxes to encourage Chinese tourists to visit (Daily FT 2019). The Tourism Ministry 
of Sri Lanka had also launched numerous publicity campaigns across China, trained people 
in Mandarin and started discussions with budget airlines to start direct flights between the 
two countries (Xinhua 2019c: np). While we may see tourism revenue fall in the short term in 
the aftermath of the coronavirus COVID-19, the Chinese market shows promise for the Sri 
Lanka tourism industry in the long term. In comparison to other destinations in Asia, ‘current 
Chinese tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka are negligible’ (Deyshappriya 2019: 387). Only 0.06 per 
cent of Chinese tourists visit Sri Lanka, as opposed to 41.05 per cent for Hong Kong, 25.7 
per cent for Macau and 4.33 per cent for South Korea (Deyshappriya 2019: 387). The growth 
rate of Chinese tourists in Sri Lanka, however, has increased enormously, growing by 99 per 
cent from 2012-2013. This implies that Sri Lanka’s tourism industry can be capitalised upon 
effectively by attracting more Chinese visitors. 
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2.2.4 New opportunities and potential for innovation and scaling-up 
In this section, we present opportunities for trilateral cooperation between the UK, China and 
Sri Lanka. While there are currently no trilateral cooperation platforms between the UK, 
China and Sri Lanka, we draw upon trilateral initiatives that the three countries have 
previously been involved in. Then, we summarise the potential areas for future trilateral 
cooperation, identifying how they can contribute to Sri Lanka’s national development 
priorities, the potential partners involved and the anticipated challenges. 
2.2.4.1 Existing trilateral cooperation 
Recent trilateral cooperation projects involving the UK, China and Sri Lanka were selected 
based on their relevance to Sri Lanka’s national development priorities. They include:  
Table 9: Current trilateral projects in Sri Lanka 
Parties Trilateral 
Project 
Thematic 
Area(s)/ 
Criteria 
Outcomes 
UNDP, 
MOFCOM, 
Sri Lanka 
*Trilateral 
Cooperation on 
Renewable 
Energy in Sri 
Lanka 
Agriculture 
 
Technology 
 
 
• Demonstrated use of hybrid RET 
systems for energy savings and 
GHG emission reduction in small- 
and medium-sized agro-industry 
including farm, agricultural 
activities, and agro-processing 
• South-South knowledge and 
experience exchanged 
(UNDP China 2020) 
FAO, Sri 
Lanka, 
China 
*FAO-China 
South-South 
Cooperation 
Programme 
Agriculture • Increase of fruit production and 
trade 
• Capacity building and technical 
support for value-addition 
• Increase farmers‘ income 
(Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 2018) 
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Ethiopia, Sri 
Lanka, 
China (with 
UNDP 
support) 
*Promoting 
South-South 
Cooperation in 
Renewable 
Energy: 
Ethiopia, Sri 
Lanka and 
China 
Physical 
infrastructure: 
renewable 
energy 
 
Technology 
• To promote sustainable energy 
solutions by focusing on 
demonstrating the applicability of 
biogas and solar photovoltaic 
technologies for communities in 
Ethiopia and Sri Lanka 
    (UNDP Ethiopia 2019) 
China, UK, 
Uganda and 
Malawi 
AgriTT: 
introduction of 
Chinese 
technologies to 
agricultural 
sectors; UK 
(DFID) support  
Agriculture 
 
Technology 
• Expansion of cassava cultivation in 
Western Uganda: increasing 
productivity, improving processing 
and harvesting, developing value-
added cassava products 
• Improve and expand aquaculture 
practices for tilapia: decrease cost of 
production by increasing efficiency 
and lowering costs of inputs; 
improve tilapia value chain 
    (Buckley 2017) 
Sri Lanka, 
India, Japan  
*Joint 
development of 
the Eastern 
Container 
Terminal at the 
Colombo Port 
Physical 
infrastructure: 
port 
development 
• Inconclusive but may be affected by 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election and 
previous experience with the 
Hambanota port. Rajapaksa 
emphasises national security and 
ownership of strategic assets 
(India Times 2019; The Straits 
Times 2019) 
UK, Brazil, 
African 
Union 
Enhancing 
Effective 
Development 
Cooperation 
Between the 
Friendly, non-
aligned 
foreign policy 
for Sri Lanka: 
recognising 
the standing 
• Importance of national contexts 
• Need for all three countries to have 
input from the beginning 
• Need to assess the partnership, to 
discuss challenges 
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UK, Brazil and 
Africa 
of developed 
countries like 
the UK 
 
Helps 
maintain Sri 
Lanka’s 
national 
sovereignty  
(Wilton Park 2016) 
*in progress, yet to be evaluated. 
Key finding from Sri Lanka’s trilateral involvement 
Accumulation of similar thematic areas: Current trilateral cooperation initiatives mainly 
focus on agriculture, technology transfer and increasing infrastructure capabilities. While 
there are many other opportunities for trilateral cooperation, it is imperative for us to consider 
the findings of previous initiatives. New sector-specific challenges may crop up in the future, 
but the process of building knowledge, learning and re-learning will allow us to refine future 
projects. 
Future trilateral platforms can involve diverse actors: Other than national trilateral 
cooperation, future trilateral platforms can possibly be built through intranational 
organisations such as the UN. Trilateral cooperation can also involve civil society 
organisations and private firms in the future. While the results of trilateral projects supported 
by the UNDP involving Sri Lanka and China have yet to be conclusive, much can be learnt 
from the setting up of mechanisms and institutions in the implementation of the projects. 
 
Sri Lankan politics will greatly affect the implementation of development projects: Sri 
Lanka’s national politics is a significant factor in determining the success of the partnership 
with the UK and China. The former Sirisena government had signed a deal with India and 
Japan to develop the Eastern Container Terminal at the Colombo Port trilaterally. However, 
the project has been inconclusive due to the change in administration (India Times 2019; 
The Straits Times 2019), which has traditionally leaned toward India and Japan’s regional 
strategic opponent China. There are now several factors at play in determining the Sri 
Lankan’s government willingness to work with China and the UK: the perception of the threat 
to national sovereignty/security, the danger of debt traps and the image of the incumbent 
government.  
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2.2.4.2 Future areas of cooperation 
Trilateral cooperation in general poses a unique set of challenges, of which we will explore in 
detail in section 3. For now, we turn to future areas of cooperation in relation to Sri Lanka’s 
national development vision. 
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Table 10: Future areas for cooperation with Sri Lanka 
Thematic area Contribution to national 
development priorities 
Potential partners Risks 
Trade: streamlining 
global supply chain of 
the apparel industry, 
promoting awareness of 
current Asia Pacific 
Trade Agreement 
concessions for specialty 
products like tea and 
coconut 
People-centred economic growth; 
takes advantage of comparative 
advantage (Sri Lanka’s niche and 
reputation for ratifying the International 
Labour Organisation convention) and 
generates possibility for value-addition 
 
 
 
UK Department for 
International Trade; Ministry of 
Commerce China; Sri Lanka-
China Business Council; UK 
private retail firms; Chinese 
suppliers; advertising firms in 
the UK; China and Sri Lanka 
and SMEs in the three 
countries 
Need to convince all parties of 
benefits of securing a streamlined 
supply chain. This cooperation is 
susceptible to competition from other 
countries in terms of quality and price 
 
APTA concessionary products will still 
be in competition with other global 
substitutes; dependent on world prices 
Trade: The UK and 
China can mediate 
between South Asian 
countries and help 
increase intra-regional 
trade 
People-centred economic growth 
 
Increase export revenue 
 
Enrichment of the BRI, potentially 
increases overall trade. Elevates Sri 
Lanka’s position in South Asia by 
UK Department for 
International Trade;  and 
Ministry of Commerce China 
Region’s preference for import 
substitution policies (Kathuria 2018) 
 
Mediation can be seen as foreign 
interference 
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leveraging its Commonwealth 
membership and ties with the UK 
Investment: simplify 
visa processes for 
business and study; 
invest in human capital 
People-centric economic 
development; complements the 
Business Revival Programme 
 
A productive citizenry and vibrant 
human resource: exchanges can 
facilitate knowledge transfer in 
technical skills and also soft skills in 
cooperation 
UK Home Office; Ministry of 
Public Security China; and 
education institutions and 
commercial firms from the UK, 
Sri Lanka and China 
Needs to be complemented by a 
stable political environment in Sri 
Lanka, as well as Sri Lankans‘ 
entrepreneurial spirit. Possibility of 
brain drain from Sri Lanka to the UK 
and China in the long-run 
Investment in 
infrastructure: ease of 
doing business, meeting 
international standards 
Physical resources, connectivity. 
Better infrastructure can boost 
tourism, increase agricultural 
productivity in relation to transport, 
help Sri Lankan ports become 
logistical hubs 
 
Sustainable environmental 
management: infrastructure projects 
Chinese firms involved in the 
BRI; Chinese state-owned 
enterprises; the AIIB; the Sri 
Lankan government; the UK 
Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs; the UK 
Infrastructure and Projects 
Authority; and local 
communities in Sri Lanka 
Perceptions of debt-trap diplomacy. 
Projects identified may not be fiscally 
or practically sustainable. Truly 
participatory approaches that involve 
the local communities in Sri Lanka will 
also make execution more difficult 
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need to keep in mind environmental 
impacts and effects on local 
communities 
Ecotourism: leveraging 
on Sri Lanka’s natural 
landscape 
People-centric economic 
development: developing the 
economy, involving local communities 
and focusing on sustainability 
 
Values based society: possibility of 
promoting indigenous ways of living 
including products such as herbal 
remedies 
 
UK Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs; Chinese Ministry of 
Environmental Protection; Sri 
Lanka Ecotourism Foundation; 
and Research institutions from 
the UK, Sri Lanka and China, 
e.g. The Travel Foundation, 
Asia Pacific Computer 
Emergency Response Team,  
Pacific Asia Travel Association 
Creating greater social inequality or 
social unrest by prioritising one 
geographic area over another. 
Sustainable tourism can cause greater 
damage to the environment if 
implemented badly. Global dynamics 
such as financial crises and the 
ongoing COVID-19 epidemic will 
dampen the tourism sector 
nonetheless 
Technology: agriculture Technology-based society: increased 
productivity through the use of 
biotechnology 
 
People-centric economic 
development: making farming an 
attractive profession, expanding 
FAO; UK-China Sustainable 
Agriculture Innovation Network 
and Knowledge Sharing and 
Mutual Learning Platform; The 
Joint UK-China Centre for the 
Sustainable Intensification of 
Agriculture; Sri Lankan Ministry 
Technologies will have to be adapted 
to Sri Lankan’s agricultural landscape. 
Knowledge sharing may take a longer 
time than expected as a learning 
curve can be anticipated. Cultural 
perceptions of farming as a profession 
will take time to change. Sri Lanka 
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export markets and increasing export 
revenue, contributing to GDP growth, 
eliminating seasonal poverty, 
opportunities for technical cooperation 
and knowledge transfer 
 
Sustainable environmental 
management: environmentally friendly 
agricultural practices 
of Agriculture; the China 
National Agriculture Wholesale 
Market Association; UK 
Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs; 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs; and research 
institutions from the UK, Sri 
Lanka and China e.g. 
Biotechnology and Biological 
Sciences Research Council, 
LCIRAH, Rothamsted 
Research, Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences, 
Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian 
Research and Training 
Institute, Tea Research 
Institute of Sri Lanka, etc. 
may need to adopt protectionist 
measures for agricultural products in 
the short term, increasing the burden 
on the country’s balance of payments 
temporarily. Protectionist measures 
(especially when implemented or a 
long time and without complementary 
measures) may lead the agriculture 
industry to be less competitive, stifling 
innovation and productivity in the long 
run 
Technology: security  National security: cybersecurity, 
terrorism, drug trafficking, ICT support 
for personnel 
 
China-UK High Level Security 
Dialogue; Sri Lanka Ministry of 
Digistal Infrastructure and 
Information Security; UK 
Perception of foreign interference (e.g. 
US and UK’s perception of Huawei 
5G—spy technology from China, 
previous allegations of cybergroup 
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Technology based society: through 
ICT support, training, and sharing 
expertise on legislating for data 
protection, cybersecurity and 
intellectual property rights 
National Cyber Security 
Centre; China Ministry of State 
Security; and Private 
technology firms in the UK, 
China and Sri Lanka e.g. 
Xiaomi, Huawei, Virtusa, 99X 
Technology, EY, Clearswift 
APT 10 acting on behalf of the 
Chinese state targeting commercial 
firms in Europe, Asia and the US). 
China can however provide assistance 
in less controversial areas, for 
example providing training on the use 
of ICT and the UK can share 
knowledge on legislation 
 
Needs to be complemented with 
infrastructure provisions 
Education: training, 
formal schooling, youth 
participation, health 
A productive citizenry and vibrant 
human resource: infrastructure and 
technology to be provided to needy 
rural schools, reformation of 
curriculum, skill alignment with job 
markets, increase university 
capacities, reduce stress, eradicate 
ragging 
China’s BRI project for 
infrastructure investments; 
British Council; UK FCO 
(Chevening Scholarships); Sri 
Lanka-China Business Council; 
and Research institutions on 
pedagogy and on global 
market needs in all three 
countries; Businesses in Sri 
Lanka, China and the UK 
(corporate social responsibility 
The UK and China can support the Sri 
Lankan government, but 
implementation will depend largely on 
Sri Lankan’s institutional capacities. 
The need to prioritise (due to funding, 
capacities, etc) may lead to a less 
holistic transformative approach, 
focusing on some areas and 
neglecting others 
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programs) e.g. Huawei’s 
Seeds for the Future 
Health: education, 
service delivery, 
improving patient care, 
building public fitness 
facilities 
A productive citizenry and vibrant 
human resource: shifting to 
preventative care, upgrading hospital 
infrastructure, reducing waiting lists, 
modernising indigenous health 
systems, sporting events for youth, 
upholding the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and 
address child undernutrition, training 
personnel 
China’s BRI project for 
infrastructure investments, 
Fleming Fund; experience 
sharing from the UK on health 
systems; expertise on nutrition 
programmes in other countries; 
and support for endorsement 
of the UNCRC 
Sri Lanka’s fiscal management 
strategy need to be sound or the 
country may risk falling into a debt 
trap. Indigenous health systems may 
support and specific localised 
approach 
Reconciliation and 
social inequality: 
women, differently abled, 
right to practise religion 
without fear, social 
protection for the poor 
A productive citizenry and vibrant 
human resource: increasing 
productivity of workforce by including 
disadvantaged groups, provisions for 
the less able and elderly to live with 
dignity through welfare programmes 
 
Funding and bureaucratic 
coordination: Conflict, Stability 
and Security Fund; UK FCO; 
Chinese Ministry of Civil 
Affairs; and Chinese National 
Health Commission 
 
There is a need to respect 
knowledges and ensure that the Sri 
Lankan perspective is not invalidated. 
Questions also remain regarding the 
transferability of knowledge to different 
national contexts 
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Disciplined, law abiding and values 
based society: Buddhism first and 
foremost but in coexistence with other 
religion, rule of law, freedom of 
speech and publication, conservation 
of historical heritage, social protection 
and welfare to address social 
inequality 
 
A new constitution that fulfills the 
wishes of the people: establishment of 
an Inter-Religious Advisory Council to 
resolve minor tensions between 
religious and ethnic groups before 
they grow, bridging the communication 
gap by making students learn 
Sinhalese and Tamil 
 
Knowledge sharing: NHS; UK 
National Trust; and research 
institutions 
 
China and the UK to share 
experiences of conflict 
mediation: experiences in 
Syria; Israel-Palestine; and 
Bangladesh-Myanmar etc. UK 
to also share own experience 
on peace process in Northern 
Ireland   
Reconciliation efforts may be quite 
superficial as the Sri Lankan 
government has conflated the cause 
with social inequality. Historical 
tensions may not be resolved and may 
persist or evolve when appearance 
does not match reality 
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Governance: 
democratic governance, 
corruption and 
bureaucratic efficiency 
A new constitution that fulfils the 
wishes of the people: appointment on 
the basis of meritocracy, removal of 
bureaucratic red tape, restructuring to 
meet the SDGs, curbing election 
related expenditure 
 
A productive citizenry and vibrant 
human resource: youth participation in 
politics to be encouraged, education to 
be unified under one ministry 
 
Disciplined, law abiding and values 
based society: government to protect 
and not challenge the rule of law 
UNDP; UK FCO; China State 
Commission Office; NGOs 
such as UK Youth and British 
Youth Council; and Ministry of 
Education China on 
centralising education 
Bureaucratic inefficiency and 
corruption may manifest themselves 
differently or even serve different 
functions in the varying contexts 
 
It is difficult for China and the UK to 
interfere in Sri Lankan’s national 
politics and to hold the Sri Lankan 
government accountable for their 
promises 
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To begin with, the UK and China can deepen cooperation in areas that they have already 
been working on with Sri Lanka, including in agriculture, health, education, technology and 
infrastructure investment. As all three parties learn from their experiences, trilateral 
cooperation can then be expanded to other areas. 
 
In the next section, we explore the challenges in trilateral cooperation by focusing on the UK 
and China. We examine their relationship and identify areas of trilateral cooperation for the 
two countries based on their expertise and currently existing development cooperation 
mechanisms.  
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3 China-UK engagements and the possibilities of 
trilateral cooperation 
Trilateral cooperation led by the UK and China is unique at a time in which global leaders 
such as the US have become increasingly inward looking. Trump’s administration and its 
infamous America First policy led to a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Office 
of the United States Trade Representative 2018). The US withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement is also expected to come into effect at the end of 2020 (Pompeo 2019). 
Simultaneously, the UK increasingly looks outward. Global Britain and the UK’s post-Brexit 
trade negotiations create new cooperation opportunities. China’s Going Out policy and 
intensified global projects strengthened through the BRI provides a strong impetus for 
exchanges and partnerships. As the second and fifth largest economies and influential 
geopolitical actors, the UK and China hold meaningful responsibilities for future development 
processes around the world.  
Embracing this, the UK and China have approached each other and can use their 
complementary roles for common strategies. The UK’s changing trajectories also shift the 
country’s development priorities. The UK increasingly focuses on mechanisms of capacity-
building and self-reliance for their partner country. The discourse on ‘people-to-people 
exchanges’ is increasingly used and aid for trade linkages have become more likely. These 
changing circumstances provide strong commonalities for bilateral cooperation between the 
UK and China (DFID 2018; Worley 2020).  
Today, China and the UK cooperate in areas of trade and industry; energy and transport; 
finance (the internationalisation of RMB); people-to-people exchanges; and security issues, 
as well as in research on health, urbanisation, welfare, science and technology. These are 
discussed at various bilateral platforms including the Annual Prime Minister’s Meeting, the 
Strategic Dialogue, Business Summits, the Economic and Financial Dialogue, high-level 
security dialogues, and the High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (UK Government 2015). 
China has also deepened its strategic partnership with the EU through the China-EU 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which concluded with a China-EU Investment Agreement, 
and negotiations on a China-EU Free Trade Agreement (ibid; European Commission 2019b). 
In 2015, the UK joined the new China-led AIIB after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit 
in October 2015, signing US$38 billion in business deals. The state visit was said to be 
opening the golden era in UK-China relations (UK Government 2015). Both sides have an 
interest in supporting each other’s major initiatives: China’s BRI and the UK’s National 
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Infrastructure Plan and the Northern PowerHouse (HM Treasury 2015). Infrastructure 
increasingly becomes a cooperation nexus. For example, the UK-China Infrastructure 
Alliance is a platform designed to bring together British and Chinese infrastructure 
capabilities and to attract Chinese investment into UK infrastructure projects. The first UK-
China Infrastructure Academy course was launched in 2016 to educate delegates from 
Chinese companies and government departments on the policy, financial, planning and legal 
frameworks governing the UK’s infrastructure environment (UK Government 2016).  
Other UK-China projects include: 
• the UK-China Joint Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation 
launched in 2017; 
• the establishment of the UK-China Research and Innovation Partnership Fund; 
• the 6th UK-China Energy Dialogue, Offshore Wind Industry Advisory Group 
Meeting; and 
• the UK-China Civil Nuclear Energy Working Cooperation Group Meeting setting 
out mutually beneficial goals to tackle climate change through innovation. 
(HM Treasury 2019) 
The bilateral relationship between the UK and China has an immediate effect on their trade, 
investment and relationship as development partners. As major actors in the international 
political economy and development, there is potential for great complementarity between 
China and the UK. As part of the BRICS grouping, China spearheads the rise of South-South 
cooperation while the UK is a leader in the traditional development infrastructure led by the 
global North. China-UK cooperation sets development priorities and builds strategic 
platforms. As the UK and China strengthen their bilateral relations, recognise their 
complementarity, and the possibility for innovating in financial and technical collaboration, 
trilateral cooperation mechanisms could be deployed to create mutually beneficial strategies 
and economic advancement (DFID and Greening 2014; OECD 2016). 
The trilateral cooperation between the UK, China and Africa may be an inspiration for further 
engagements with other partners, for example Sri Lanka. As China and the UK already have 
many common communication platforms focusing on different sectors and cooperation 
levels, trilateral cooperation is likely to expand in the coming years. Expansion is possible 
through engagement in extensive and upscaled projects, possibly also in other countries. At 
the same time, the current UK-China-Africa trilateral cooperation marks challenges which 
need to be addressed to guarantee mutual benefits for all parties involved.  
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Most trilateral cooperation projects between the UK, China and Africa (as discussed in 
section 2.1.4) still need to be thoroughly evaluated. Similarly, trilateral cooperation projects 
involving Sri Lanka are still in their infancy (see section 2.2.4). Following that, it is necessary 
to formulate common frameworks to jointly assess projects based on substantive values 
added by each partner involved and to be transparent about outcomes. Evaluating trilateral 
cooperation projects will be necessary to understand short-comings and the substantivity of 
development projects. Despite the current short-term trilateral cooperation mechanisms, we 
address some of the challenges in the following policy recommendations.  
We make these recommendations based on evaluations of previous trilateral cooperation. 
Here we sum up the challenges faced in trilateral cooperation that informed our 
recommendations: 
Technology transfer cannot be guaranteed. Chinese technical assistance may not 
necessarily be adaptable to local contexts, for example in terms of scale, safety standards, 
energy source and logistical arrangements (Zhou 2018). There needs to be a holistic focus 
on sectors: focusing on technology alone will lead to a fragmented approach in improving the 
value chain, leaving out the private sector, socioeconomic factors and the market (Buckley 
2017). Technologies also need to be suited to the target audience and national needs. They 
need to be able to attract investors, easily taken up by locals and sustainable in the long run 
(ibid). This necessitates a deeper understanding of the country at the national, local and 
community levels. 
Coordination challenges need to be overcome. While South-South cooperation can 
contribute to a more horizontal relationship in comparison to traditional developmental aid 
approaches, the actual situation depends on the execution of the project. Firstly, China and 
the UK need to both commit to realising a more horizontal relationship with the third country 
(Zhou 2018). Secondly, disagreements over issues of financial management, management 
structure and compliance of regulations place funders in positions of power that cannot be 
denied (ibid).  
All three countries should have inputs from the inception of the project, all the way through to 
monitoring and evaluation to have true ownership of the project (Wilton Park 2016). This 
brings up challenges of institutional capacities, especially considering that development 
agencies may have a large number of projects to oversee. Having to come to consensus is 
also time-consuming: spaces for dialogue have to be created and partners have to be 
acutely aware of power relations.  
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There is a need to continue to innovate to create better monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms for trilateral cooperation. Monitoring and evaluation for trilateral 
cooperations can be tricky, particularly as ‘the substantive value of each partner involved’ is 
difficult to demonstrate (UNDP 2016: 13). Expected results such as mutual learning and 
technical support can also be difficult to measure. Current tools designed to evaluate North-
South cooperation may be inadequate for evaluating South-South cooperation.  
Based on the challenges prevalent in trilateral cooperation, we present our key findings and 
recommendations for future trilateral cooperation projects below. 
Table 11: Recommendations for overcoming challenges in trilateral cooperation 
Strategies The level of 
intervention 
Potential partners and entry points 
Learn from best practices 
(e.g.  contractual, project 
management, 
communication and 
evaluation mechanism, 
team roles, mutually 
agreed quality standards 
and time plans) 
Intra-national DFID and the Chinese National Health and 
Family Planning Commission who identified 
common aid priority countries and their needs 
for a common health project in Africa 
 
FAO-China-Sri Lanka trilateral cooperation on 
agriculture and UNDP-China-Sri Lanka 
trilateral cooperation on renewable energy: 
The UK can learn from the bureaucratic 
workings of setting up trilateral cooperation 
with China and Sri Lanka; possibly setting up 
cooperation with UN support 
 
Expanding the capacity 
of cooperation projects to 
sufficiently evaluate the 
substansiveness of 
trilateral cooperation 
projects 
International, 
Local 
implementation 
Involving evaluation institutions like ITAD and 
the recently agreed upon project 
development facility (During UK-Africa 
Investment Summit the UK agreed to initiate 
this facility to provide skills and expertise for 
economic projects and the attraction of 
finances from the private sector) 
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Involving local government and civil society 
actors in monitoring and implementation as 
well as to gain insights on possible ways of 
evaluation that may be different in a South-
South context (UNDP 2016) 
Common centralised 
frameworks  
Intra-national Using existing dialogue platforms such as the 
UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue 
and the annual high-level Dialogues on 
Africa. The UK could potentially use the 
FOCAC as an entry point; or to learn better 
communication and/or working styles from 
the Africa-China relationship 
 
Common frameworks on 
sub-national, 
decentralised level with 
local governments, civil 
society, the private 
sector and academia to 
ensure frequent 
exchanges and quick 
information flow 
Sub-national, 
County/ 
municipality 
level 
Deriving from existing platforms and in 
cooperation with DFID/FCO and Chinese 
ministries (depending on the topic, e.g. the 
Chinese Ministry of Education) 
Coordinated efforts 
involving African 
governments and 
regional institutions to 
strengthen the decisive 
power of concerned 
countries, the sectors 
and scope of 
interventions 
 
Regional African Union, the African Economic 
Community, the Kenyan government in close 
relationship with the UK and Chinese 
government and FOCAC (and sub-nationally 
with specific agencies and ministries) 
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Academic exchanges to 
enhance mutual 
understanding on 
cooperation interests, 
needs and skills for 
trilateral cooperation  
 
National,  
Local 
Academic institutions (universities and think-
tanks, e.g. the Kenya Institute for Public 
Policy Research and Analysis, the China 
Development Institute, the Institute of 
Development Studies) and international 
networks such as UK-China Sustainable 
Agriculture Innovation Network. Exchanges 
can also involve private businesses such as 
technology firms 
Creating widely 
accessible material on 
progress and 
cooperation outcomes (in 
English, Chinese and 
national languages of 
third countries) 
 
International, 
National 
The UK Government and the Chinese 
Government in close cooperation with the 
British and Chinese media, e.g. the BBC and 
Xinhua or the Belt and Road Portal. National 
governments e.g. Sri Lanka with national 
media outlets like Sri Lanka Broadcasting 
Corporation 
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4 Conclusion 
Emerging countries are now increasingly involved in development, with China leading the 
way through the BRI and its increasing political clout. Traditional donors like the UK, 
however, have had much experience in international cooperation. With China pursuing win-
win resolutions, it seems inevitable that it will increasingly engage with countries like the UK 
in international development.  
In this paper, we examined the potential of UK-China engagements in two developing 
countries: Kenya and Sri Lanka. While Kenya and Sri Lanka are both middle-income, 
developing countries, they have had very different historical relations with China and the UK. 
Furthermore, both countries have set out specific national development plans, with concrete 
goals and aspirations. We examined Kenya’s and Sri Lanka’s current economic relations 
with China and the UK as well as people-to-people exchanges in health, education, 
technology and commerce. Evaluating and comparing current engagements, we make 
recommendations for trilateral cooperation in Sri Lanka and Kenya in the areas of trade, 
investment and knowledge-sharing. Keeping in mind that the two cases share fundamentally 
different social, economic and political contexts, we also make specific recommendations for 
cooperation in Sri Lanka and Kenya based on past experiences with development 
cooperation in the respective countries. 
Trilateral development cooperation is complex as countries involved have different priorities. 
Challenges arise due to their different experiences in development. However, accompanying 
challenges are unique opportunities presented by their varying areas of expertise, enabled 
by a common Sgoal of mutual benefit. All countries hope to stimulate economic growth 
primarily through trade and investments. The UK and China can provide support with 
capacity building through infrastructure projects, technical support and knowledge sharing. 
Moreover, all countries have a stake in political stability. While development cooperation is 
subject to the dynamism of international and national politics, much can be achieved with 
political will and commitment.  
Kenya, Sri Lanka, the UK and China have various entry points to and experiences in trilateral 
activities. For the establishment of UK-China-Kenya and UK-China-Sri Lanka trilateral 
cooperation mechanisms, it is essential to understand the national context, development 
needs, areas of expertise and cooperation experiences to achieve outputs beneficial for all. 
Trilateral cooperation enables the combination of complementary knowledge, in which every 
actor can be a potential provider, facilitator and beneficiary.  
   
 
 86 
5 References 
Abi-Habib, M. (2018) ‘How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port’, The New York 
Times, 25 June, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-
port.html (accessed 10 February 2020) 
Admingajaba (2019a) ‘Sri Lanka High Commission in London Conducts Economic 
Outreach Programme on ‘Investment and Trade Opportunities in Sri Lanka’ 
Targeting the British-Sri Lankan Community’, High Commission of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in the United Kingdom, 5 September, 
https://srilankahc.uk/2019/09/05/sri-lanka-high-commission-in-london-conducts-
economic-outreach-programme-on-investment-and-trade-opportunities-in-sri-lanka-
targeting-the-british-sri-lankan-community/ (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Admingajaba (2019b) ‘High Commissioner of Sri Lanka Discusses Economic Cooperation 
with UK Secretary of State for International Trade Dr. Liam Fox’, High Commission 
of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in the United Kingdom, 26 March, 
https://srilankahc.uk/2019/03/26/high-commissioner-of-sri-lanka-discusses-
economic-cooperation-with-uk-secretary-of-state-for-international-trade-dr-liam-fox/ 
(accessed 3 March 2020) 
African Development Bank Group, OECD and UNDP (2014) Global Value Chains and 
Africa’s Industrialisation: African Economic Outlook 2014, Paris: OECD Publishing 
African Farming and Food Processing (2015) ‘China funding agriculture research lab in 
Kenya’, African Farming and Food Processing, 28 September, 
http://www.africanfarming.net/technology/infrastructure/china-funding-agriculture-
research-lab-in-kenya (accessed 9 March 2020) 
African Review of Business and Technology (2015) ‘Kenya and China launch solar 
technology transfer and training institute’, African Review of Business and 
Technology, 27 April, http://www.africanreview.com/energy-a-
power/renewables/kenya-and-china-launch-solar-technology-transfer-and-training-
institute (accessed 9 March 2020) 
African Union (2015) Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-
docagenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf (accessed 10 February 2020) 
Arif, A. and Rafique, N. (2017) Growing Chinese Investments in Sri Lanka, Pakistan: Institute 
of Strategic Studies (ISSI), http://issi.org.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/IB_Areeba_dated_1-6-2017.pdf (accessed 10 February 
2020) 
   
 
 87 
Athukorala, P. and Ekanayake, R. (2018) ‘Repositioning in the Global Apparel Value Chain in 
the Post-MFA Era: Strategic Issues and Evidence from Sri Lanka’, Development 
Policy Review 36.S1: O247–O269, http://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12226 (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Austrian Development Agency (2016) Interim Report Policy Dialogue, Vienna: 
Austrian Development Agency, https://www.care.at/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/S-14-207_ADA_Progress-Report-Policy-Dialogue-
Consortia-2015_final.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Baker, M. (2017) ‘Belt & Road: Opportunity & Risk: The Prospects and Perils of Building 
China’s New Silk Road’, Baker McKenzie, 10 October, 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/beltroad/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_
2017.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Belsen Wahlén, C. (2019) ‘Second Belt and Road Forum Results in Over 283 
Deliverables‘, IISD SDG Knowledge Hub, 2 May, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/second-
belt-and-road-forum-results-in-over-283-deliverables/ (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Belt and Road Forum (2019) ‘List of Deliverables of the Second Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation’, The Second Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation, 27 April, http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/0427/c36-
1312.html (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Belt and Road Portal (2017) Belt and Road The Silk Road Economic Belt + the 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Beijing: Belt and Road Portal, 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm (accessed 9 March 2020) 
British Council (2020) Our Work in Society, 
https://www.britishcouncil.co.ke/programmes/society (accessed 11 February 2020) 
British High Commission Nairobi (2019) In Support of Kenya's Fight Against Corruption: UK 
and Other Embassies, Nairobi: Government of the UK and Government of the 
Republic of Kenya, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/in-support-of-kenyas-fight-
against-corruption-uk-and-other-embassies (accessed 3 March 2020) 
British High Commission Nairobi and Republic of Kenya Ministry of Education (2019) 
UK-Kenya Joint Statement Scientific Research, Innovation and Affordable 
Housing, Nairobi: Government of the UK and Government of the Republic of 
Kenya, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/832050/UK-Kenya-Joint-Stat-Scientific-Research-
Affordable-Housing.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
   
 
 88 
Bruce, R.R. (2013) ‘Sri Lanka Textile Industry’s Public Private Partnership Project: A Case 
Study’, International Journal of Public Sector Management 26.2: 153–162 
Buckley, L. (2013) ‘Chinese Agriculture Development Cooperation in Africa: Narratives and 
Politics’, IDS Bulletin 44.4, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/2607 (accessed 3 March 
2020) 
Buckley, L. (2017) Trilateral Cooperation in Agriculture: Achievements and Lessons from 
AgriTT, London: IIED, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/553f9958e4b06d466cd3ce1e/t/59675005bebaf 
b35fed6ad90/1499942960627/IIED+Lesson+Learning+Study+on+AgriTT.pdf 
(accessed 10 March 2020) 
Burke, J. (2011) ‘Adam Weritty and Liam Fox’s Sri Lankan Connections’, The Guardian, 13 
October, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/13/adam-werritty-liam-fox-
sri-lanka#maincontent (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Calabrese, L. and Eberhard-Ruiz, A. (2016) What Types of Non-tariff Barriers Affect the 
East African Community?, London: Overseas Development Institute 
CARE (2019) ‘Consortium Project “Civil Society Organizations & Public Policy Dialogue” in 
East Africa‘, Care Evaluations, 1 June, 
https://www.careevaluations.org/evaluation/consortium-project-civil-society- 
organizations-policy-dialogue-in-east-africa/ (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2018) Sri Lanka Economy Snapshot, 
https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/sri-lanka-economy-snapshot (accessed 10 March 
2020) 
Chatham House (2019) The Future of UK-China Relations, London: Chatham House, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/future-uk-china-relations (accessed 3 March 
2020) 
Chellaney, B. (2017) ‘China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy’, Project Syndicate, 23 January, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-
by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog (accessed 10 January 2020) 
Chevening (2019) ‘Chevening’, https://www.chevening.org/ (accessed 13 February 
2020) China Africa Research Initiative (2020) Data: China Africa Trade, 
Washington DC: Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, http://www.sais-
cari.org/data-china-africa-trade (accessed 13 February 2020) 
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (2019) 
Special Policy Study on Green Belt and Road and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development Policy Report, Beijing: China Council for International Cooperation on 
   
 
 89 
Environment and Development, 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/cciced/agm/cciced-sps-green-belt-
roads.pdf (accessed 9 March 2020) 
COMTRADE (n.d.) Data, https://comtrade.un.org/data (accessed 20 January 
2020) CRBC (2020) Kenya Office Introduction, Beijing: China Road and 
Bridge 
Corporation, https://www.crbc.com/site/crbcEN/KenyaOffice/index.html (accessed 9 March 
2020) 
D’Souza, J. and Moore, T. (2017) ‘Education in Sri Lanka: Current Trends and 
Qualifications’, World Education News + Reviews, 16 August, 
https://wenr.wes.org/2017/08/education-in-sri-lanka (accessed 14 February 2020) 
Daily FT (2019) ‘Chinese Help to Revive Sri Lanka’s Tourism’, 29 July, 
http://www.ft.lk/front-page/Chinese-help-to-revive-Sri-Lanka-s-tourism/44-682879 
(accessed 12 February 2020) 
Darwin Initiative (2015) Country: Sri Lanka, 
darwininitiative.org.uk/project/location/country/sri-lanka/ (accessed 12 March 2020) 
Deloitte (2018) If You Want to Prosper, First Build Roads: Africa Construction Trends 
Report, https://www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/international-business-
support/articles/2018-africa-construction-trends-report.html (accessed 10 January 
2020) 
Deyshappriya, N.P.R. (2017) ‘China is Sri Lanka’s Biggest Source of FDI, But There is 
Room for More’, South Asia @ LSE blog, 12 September, 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2017/09/12/china-is-sri-lankas-biggest-source-of-fdi-
but-there-is-room-for-more/ (accessed 16 February 2020) 
Deyshappriya, N.P.R. (2019) ‘Sri Lanka–China Economic Relations in 
Comparative Perspective: Ample Room to Grow’, China Report 55.4: 364–
392, http://doi.org/10.1177/0009445519875235 (accessed 14 February 
2020) 
DFID (n.d.a) DevTracker Country Kenya Summary Page, 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/KE/projects (accessed 13 February 
2020) 
DFID (n.d.b) DevTracker Country Sri Lanka Summary Page, 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/LK (accessed 13 February 2020) 
DFID (2004) Evaluation Summary of Victoria Project: Sri Lanka, London: Department for 
International Development, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/67900/ev392s.pdf (accessed 11 February 2020) 
   
 
 90 
 
DFID (2010) Evaluation Report DFID’s China country programme 2004-2009, London: 
Department for International Development, 
https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedkingdom/46973339.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
DFID (2014) Kenya Operational Plan 2011-2016, London: Department for International 
Development, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/389359/Kenya.pdf (accessed 24 January 2020) 
DFID (2017) ‘UK support to Kenya‘, DFID blog, 30 July, 
https://dfidnews.blog.gov.uk/2017/07/30/uk-support-to-kenya/ (accessed 11 
February 2020) 
DFID (2018) DFID Kenya country profile July 2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/723198/Kenya-July-2018.pdf (accessed 24 January 2020) 
DFID and Greening, J.Rt.Hon.MP (2014) ‘An End to Poverty: Justine Greening’s Speech to 
the China International Development Research Network’, speech, China International 
Development Research Network, Beijing, 2 April, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-end-to-poverty-justine-greenings-
speech-to-the-china-international-development-research-network (accessed 28 
January 2020) 
Dissanayake, A. et al. (2006) ‘Capacity Building Through Research and Educational 
Collaboration: A Report of a UK–Sri Lanka Collaboration’, Practical Diabetes 
International 23.8: 350–352, http://doi.org/10.1002/pdi.1008 (accessed 17 January 
2020) 
Dissanayake, D.M.S.B. (2016) ‘Identifying the Relationships Between Budget Deficit and 
Selected Macroeconomic Variables: a Study of Sri Lanka During the Post-
Liberalisation Era’, 13th International Conference on Business Management 2016: 
246-293, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2910354 
(accessed 17 January 2020) 
Ehizuelen, M. and Mitchell, O. (2018) ‘FOCAC, BRI reshaping Sino-African cooperation’, 
China Daily, 14 September, http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2018-
09/14/content_36913139.htm (accessed 14 February 2020) 
Etyang, P. (2015) ‘Sino-Kenya Trade Volume Rises by 53 percent’, China Daily, 6 March, 
http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-03/06/content_19735830.htm 
(accessed 10 January 2020) 
 
   
 
 91 
European Commission (2019a) Sri Lanka - Trade - European Commission, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/sri-
lanka/index_en.htm (accessed 15 February 2020) 
European Commission (2019b) Countries and Regions: China, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (accessed 12 
February 2020) 
FAO (2018) New FAO-China South-South Cooperation Project Launched to 
Strengthen Fruit Value Chain in Sri Lanka, Rome: Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, http://www.fao.org/partnerships/south-
south-cooperation/news/news-article/en/c/1173840/ (accessed 10 March 
2020) 
FAO (2020) Strengthening Agricultural Statistics and Food Security Information 
in Africa, Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, http://www.fao.org/3/ca7560en/CA7560EN.pdf (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014) ‘German-Israeli 
Government Consultations: Trilateral Cooperation is a Success Story’, BMZpress, 25 
February, 
https://www.bmz.de/en/press/aktuelleMeldungen/2014/februar/140225_pm_017_Ger
man-Israeli-government-consultations-trilateral-cooperation-is-a-success-
story/index.html (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Farooq, M.S.; Tongkai, Y.; Jiangang, Z. and Feroze, N. (2018) ‘Kenya and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road Implications for China-Africa Relations’, World Scientific 
4: 401-418, doi:10.1142/S2377740018500136 (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Fildes, J. (2010) ‘Kenya's Ambitions for an Outsourced Future’, BBC News, 16 
December, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12004815 (accessed 9 
March 2020) 
Fleming Fund (2018) About Us, https://www.flemingfund.org/about-us/ (accessed 
11 February 2020) 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (n.d.) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing: 
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, https://www.focac.org/eng/, (accessed 9 March 
2020) 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2006) China’s African Policy, Beijing: Forum on China– 
Africa Cooperation, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzzc/t481748.htm 
(accessed 14 February 2020) 
 
   
 
 92 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2018) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing 
Action Plan (2019-2021), Beijing: Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, 
https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm (accessed 14 February 2020) 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Xinhua (2019) ‘Kenya, China Eyes Mutual Legal 
Assistance Deal to Combat Corruption’, 26 March, 
https://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/rwjl/t1648376.htm (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Fox, L. (2019) ‘Secretary of State Keynote: UK Trade and Export Finance Forum’, speech, 
2019 UK Trade and Export Finance Forum, London, 5 June, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/secretary-of-state-keynote-ukef-trade-
and-export-finance-forum (accessed 3 March 2020) 
GAN Integrity (2017) Kenya Corruption Report, https://www.business-anti-
corruption.com/country-profiles/kenya/ (Accessed 10 January 
2020) 
Government of China (2015) Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic 
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Beijing: National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, 28 
March, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
Government of China (2016) President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya Meets with Wang Yi, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1388684.shtml (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
Government of China (2017) Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment 2017, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_33_11652_0_7.html (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
Government of Kenya (2018) Vision 2030, http://vision2030.go.ke/about-vision- 
2030/ (accessed 15 January 2020) 
Gray, K. and Gills, B.K. (2016) ‘South-South Cooperation and the Rise of the 
Global South’, Third World Quarterly 37.4: 557-574 
Green, M. (2019) ‘China’s Debt Diplomacy’, Foreign Policy, 25 April, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/ (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
GSMA (2019) ‘Case Study: RuralStar Huawei Safaricom’, 10 January, 
https://www.gsma.com/futurenetworks/wiki/ruralstar-huawei-safaricom-
case-study/ (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Gu, J.; Chuanhong, Z. and Mukwereza, L. (2016) ‘Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking 
the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa’, 
   
 
 93 
World Development 81: 24-32, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.01.001 (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Gu, J.; Holmes, P.; Rollo, J. and Mendez-Parra, M. (2015) ‘Trilateral Cooperation on 
Trade and Investment: Implications for African Industrialisation’, IDS Policy Briefing 
103, Brighton: IDS 
Gu, J. et al. (2017) ‘China–UK–Africa Trilateral Cooperation on Trade and Investment: 
Prospects and Challenges for Partnership for Africa’s Development’, IDS Evidence 
Report 207, Brighton: IDS 
Gu, S. (2018) ‘Chinese Firms Provide 50,000 Plus Jobs in Kenya with Local 
Employees Hitting 96pct, Report’, Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 25 
December, https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/125310.html (accessed 10 January 
2020) 
Hanauer, L. and Morris, L. (2014) Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, 
and Implications for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt6wq7ss (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Hirono, M. and Xu, M. (2013) ‘China’s Military Operations Other than War’, The RUSI 
Journal 158.6: 74-82, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.869726 (accessed 
3 March 2020) 
HM Government (2019) Voluntary National Review of progress towards the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
June 2019, London: Her Majesty's Government, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/23678UK_12072019_UK
_ Voluntary_National_Review_2019.pdf (accessed 8 March 2020) 
HM Treasury (2015) UK Ratifies Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), London: Her Majesty's Government, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ratifies-articles-of-agreement-of-the-asian-
infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib (accessed 12 February 2020) 
HM Treasury (2019) Factsheet: 10th UK China Economic and Financial Dialogue 17 June 
2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at 
tachment_data/file/809590/EFD_Factsheet_FINAL__003_.pdf_1.pdf (13 February 
2020) 
House of Lords Hansad (2014) UK and Sri Lanka: Bilateral Trade, 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2014-12-
11/debates/14121152000140/UKAndSriLankaBilateralTrade (accessed 8 
February 2020) 
Huawei (2017) Video Surveillance as the Foundation of "Safe City" in Kenya, Shenzhen: 
 Huawei, https://www.huawei.com/en/industry-insights/technology/digital-
   
 
 94 
 transformation/video/video-surveillance-as-the-foundation-of-safe-city-in-kenya (14 
 February 2020) 
Huawei (2019) Seeds for the Future: Kenya, Shenzhen: Huawei, 
https://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/sustainability/win-win-development/social-
contribution/seeds-for-the-future/kenya (14 February 2020) 
Ikiara, M. (2019) ‘South-South and Triangular Trade and Investment for Development’, IDS 
roundtable event, 16 January, Brighton, https://www.ids.ac.uk/events/55726/ 
(accessed 10 March 2020) 
International Monetary Fund (2019) Sri Lanka: Fifth Review Under the 
Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Request for 
Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, Extension of the 
Arrangement and Rephasing of Purchases-Press Release; Staff Report 
and Statement by the Executive Director for Sri Lanka, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/15/Sri-Lanka-
Fifth-Review-Under-the-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-Extended-
Fund-Facility-46900 (accessed 14 February 2020) 
International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation (2019) Dutch-Sino-East African Bamboo 
Development Programme, Beijing: International Bamboo and Rattan 
Organisation(INBAR), https://www.inbar.int/project/dutch-sino-east-africa-bamboo-
development-project/ (accessed 3 March 2020) 
India Times (2019) ‘Sri Lanka Signs Port Deal with India, Japan’, 28 May, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/sri-lanka-signs-port-deal-with-
india-japan/articleshow/69547981.cms (accessed 10 March 2020) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (2017) DFID’s Approach to Supporting 
Inclusive Growth in Africa, London: Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 
https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/EMBARGOED-ICAI-Review-
DFIDs-approach-to-supporting-inclusive-growth-in-Africa.pdf (accessed 8 February 
2020) 
Invest Sri Lanka - CSE (2018) Sri Lanka Tells UK Investors to Partner and Profit from New 
Resurgence, https://investsrilanka.net/tour/sri-lanka-tells-uk-investors-to-partner-
and-profit-from-new-resurgence/ (accessed 3 March 2020). 
Jayaram, K.; Kassiri, O. and Yuan Sun, I. (2017) The Closest Look Yet at Chinese 
Economic Engagement in Afric,  https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-
east-and-africa/the-closest-look-yet-at-chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa 
(accessed 10 January 2020) 
   
 
 95 
Jepchirchir, B.C. and Githahu, E.N. (2019) ‘Facilitating Trade of Import and Export Between 
Kenya and China’, European Journal of Business, Economics and Accountancy 7.4: 
22-33, http://www.idpublications.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Full-Paper-
FACILITATING-TRADE-OF-IMPORT-AND-EXPORT-BETWEEN-KENYA-AND-
CHINA.pdf (Accessed 29 February 2020) 
 
Kamau, M. (2019) ‘Kenyan farmers paying the price for using Europe’s 
poisoned agrochemicals’, Standard Media, 27 August, 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001339639/kenyan-
farmers-paying-the-price-for-using-europe-s-poisoned-agrochemicals 
(accessed 3 March 2020) 
Kandaudahewa, H. (2015) ‘Sri Lanka in Commonwealth: UK-Sri Lanka Political 
andEconomic Relations 2009-2015’, SSRN Electronic Journal 8.1: 54-59, 
http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2852947 (accessed 16 February 2020) 
Kathuria, S. (2018) A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia, 
Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30246/9781464812941
.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y (accessed 8 March 2020) 
Kawira, Y. (2015) ‘Chinese Firm Launches Railway Training Facility’, Daily Nation Kenya, 
3 July, https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Chinese-firm-launches-railway-training-
facility/996-2774228-vbb9bz/index.html (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Kelegama, S. (2014) ‘China–Sri Lanka Economic Relations: An Overview’, China Report 
50.2: 131–149, http://doi.org/10.1177/0009445514523646 (accessed 15 February 
2020) 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance (2017) Kenya Private Sector Alliance, British Chamber of 
Commerce of Kenya and Kenya China Economic and Trade Association Sign MoU 
to Foster Business Relations, KEPSA blog, https://kepsa.or.ke/kenya-private-sector-
alliance-british-chamber-of-commerce-of-kenya-and-kenya-china-economic-and-
trade-association-sign-mou-to-foster-business-relations/ (accessed 13 February 
2020) 
King, K. (2019) ‘China–Africa Education Cooperation: From FOCAC to Belt 
and Road’, ECNU Review of Education, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2096531119889874 (accessed 13 February 
2020)  
Killick, T. (2005) ‘Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa’, 
Development Policy Review 23.6: 665–681 
   
 
 96 
Krishnan, A.; te Velde, D.W. and Were, A. (2018) Kenya-UK Trade and Investment 
Relations: Taking Stock and Promoting Exports to the UK, SET and ODI, London: 
Overseas Development Institute and Department for International Development, 
https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SET-EPC-Kenya-Export-
Promotion_Final.pdf (accessed 29 February 2019) 
Leach, M.; Stirling, A.C. and Scoones, I. (2010) Dynamic Sustainabilities: Technology, 
Environment, Social Justice, London and Washington DC: Earthscan  
Lopez-Acevedo, G. and Robertson, R. (2016) Stiches to Riches? Apparel Employment, 
Trade, and Economic Development in South Asia, Washington: World Bank Group, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23961/9781464 
808135.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y (accessed 10 March 2020) 
Mbabazi, E. (2020) ‘UK Offers £15 Million for Africa’s Infrastructure’, The Kenyan Wall 
Street, 17 January, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/africa-to-receive-15-million-from-uk-
for-infrastructure/ (accessed 9 March 2020) 
McVeigh, K. (2018) ‘Cuts to UK Aid: Package to Drought-hit Kenya to End in 
2024’, The Guardian, 22 January, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/jan/22/uk-aid-package-to-drought-hit-kenya-to-end-in-
2024 (accessed 8 March 2020) 
Mendez-Parra, M.; Raga, S. and Sommer, L. (2020) Africa and the United 
Kingdom: Challenges and opportunities to expand UK investments, London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/africa_uk_investment.pdf (accessed 13 February 2020) 
Mendis, P. and Wang, J. (2019) ‘China's Era of Debt-Trap Diplomacy May Pave the Way 
for Something Sinister’, National Interest, 3 February, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-era-debt-trap-diplomacy-may-pave-way-
something-sinister-42927 (accessed 10 January 2020) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019) Aid for Trade offers possibilities for economic 
diversification, Den Haag: Government of the Netherlands, 
https://www.government.nl/topics/business-for-development/weblogs/2019/aid-for-
trade-offers-possibilities-for-economic-diversification (accessed 8 March 2020) 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Enterprise Development Kenya (2015) Press Release: 
Kenya signs MoU with Sinosteel - Chinese Leading Steel Development Company, 
Nairobi: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Enterprise Development Kenya, 
http://www.industrialization.go.ke/index.php/media-center/news-updates/176-press-
release-kenya-signs-mou-with-sinosteel-chinese-leading-steel-development-
company (accessed 9 March 2020) 
   
 
 97 
Miriri, D. (2019a) ‘China Ready for Trade Talks with East Africa Bloc: Ambassador 
to Kenya’, Reuters, 10 June, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-china-
trade/china-ready-for-trade-talks-with-east-africa-bloc-ambassador-to-kenya-
idUSKCN1TB1EC (accessed 29 February 2020) 
Miriri, D. (2019b) ‘Kenya Opens $1.5 billion Chinese-built Railway Linking Rift Valley 
town and Nairobi’, Reuters, 16 October, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-
railway/kenya-opens-chinese-built-railway-linking-rift-valley-town-to-nairobi-
idUSKBN1WV0Z0 (9 March 2020) 
Mittal, P. (2020) ‘India’s Rriangular Cooperation with the US, UK and Japan in 
Africa: a Comparative Analysis’, Observer Research Foundation, 23 January, 
https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-triangular-cooperation-with-the-us-
uk-and-japan-in-africa-a-comparative-analysis-60576/#_edn20 (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Moramudali, U. (2019a) ‘Is Sri Lanka Really a Victim of China’s ‘Debt Trap’?’, The 
Diplomat, 14 May, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/is-sri-lanka-really-a-victim-of-
chinas-debt-trap/ (accessed 12 February 2020) 
Moramudali, U. (2019b) ‘Against the Tide: The Growth of China-Sri Lanka Trade’, The 
Diplomat, 1 August, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/against-the-tide-the-growth-of-
china-sri-lanka-trade/ (accessed 15 February 2020) 
Moramudali, U. (2020) ‘The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities’, The Diplomat, 
1 January, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-
realities/ (accessed 10 February 2020) 
Morangi, L. (2018) ‘China Opens Market to Kenya's Agricultural Products’, China Daily, 11 
November, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/11/WS5be7d2f4a310eff303287e3 6.html 
(accessed 9 March 2020) 
Mubashir, M.A. (2019) ‘China is Likely to Take Over Kenya’s Main Port’, Daily Times, 
18 November, https://dailytimes.com.pk/502275/china-is-likely-to-take-over-
kenyas-main-port/ (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Muchiri, J. (2020) ‘Government Bets on ICT to Cut Unemployment Rates in Kenya’, Standard 
Media, 10 March, 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001363685/government-bets-on-
ict-to-cut-unemployment-rates (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Munda, D. (2019) ‘Kenya’s Trade Deficit Persists Despite Slowdown in 
Imports Growth’, Business Daily Economy, 28 February, 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/3946234-5004224-
yybka3/index.html (accessed 29 February 2020) 
   
 
 98 
Murathe, E. (2018) ‘Learn Kenya's Labour Laws, Employers' Lobby FKE Urges Chinese 
Firms’, Business Daily Africa, 6 April, 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/FKE-to-Chinese-firms--Learn-Kenya-
s-labour-laws/539546-4375440-arqyno/index.html (3 March 2020) 
 
Nduire, J. (2018) ‘Kenya’s Largest Solar Park Goes Live in Garissa County’, Construction 
Kenya, 13 November, https://www.constructionkenya.com/2747/china-garissa-kenya-
solar-plant/ (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Nyabwa, J. and Kaniaru, W. (2019) ‘Doing Business in Kenya: Overview’, Thomson Reuters 
Practical Law, 1 January, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-
2231?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 
(acc essed 3 March 2020) 
Observatory of Economic Complexity World (2017) Country Profile of Kenya, 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
https://oec.world/de/profile/country/ken/ (accessed 29 February 2020) 
OECD (n.d.) OECD.Stat, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed 07 February 2020) 
OECD (2016) ‘Dispelling the Myths of Triangular Co-operation’, Evidence from the 
2015 OECD Survey on Triangular Co-operation, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing 
OECD (2018) ‘The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance 
landscape’, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing, doi:10.1787/bus_fin_out-2018-
6-en (accessed 3 March 2020) 
OECD (2019) Official Development Assistance (ODA), http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-
assistance.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018) ‘The United States Officially 
Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, Washington DC: Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP (accessed 12 March 
2020) 
Ogunah, A.O. (2016) ‘Kenya, Ethiopia Bet on Technology Transfer in Their 
Railway Projects’, WITS Journalism China-Africa Reporting Project, 
http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/06/kenya-ethiopia-bet-on-technology-
transfer-in-their-railway-projects/ (accessed 14 February 2020) 
   
 
 99 
OHCHR (2014) Session25 Resolutions, Decisions and President’s Statements, Geneva: 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Pages/ResDe 
cStat.aspx (accessed 10 February 2020) 
 
OHCHR (2015) Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human rights in Sri Lanka – 
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(A/HRC/30/61), Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx (accessed 14 
February 2020) 
Okoth, E. (2020) ‘Burden on Taxpayers as Treasury Starts Repayment of SGR loan’, 
Business Daily Africa, 2 January, 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Burden-on-taxpayers-as-Treasury-
starts-repayment-of-SGR-loan/3946234-5404862-gncuxy/index.html (3 March 2020) 
Omondi, G. (2017) ‘China Downplays Concerns on Kenya’s Rising SGR debt’, 
Business Daily, 5 June, 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/China-downplays-
concerns-on-Kenya-rising-SGR-debt/3815534-3956846-14ffyc7/index.html 
(accessed 10 January 2020) 
Onjala, J. (2008) A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of 
Kenya, Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 
https://aercafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/1Kenya.pdf (accessed 9 March 
2020) 
Oxford Business Group (2016) Kenya's new plan for special economic zones, London: 
Oxford Business Group, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/zone-new-plan-
sezs-should-help-shake-country%E2%80%99s-offering-investors (3 March 2020) 
Oxford Business Group (2019) Kenya: Year in Review 2018, London: Oxford Business 
Group, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/kenya-year-review-2018 (accessed 2 
February 2020) 
Oxford Research Group (2019) The Foreign Affairs Select Committee Inquiry – Beyond Aid: 
The UK’s Strategic Engagement in Africa, Remote Warfare Programme, London: 
Oxford Research Group, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/f
oreign-affairs-committee/beyond-aid-the-uks-strategic-engagement-in-
africa/written/105355.html (accessed 10 February 2020) 
Parks, B. (2018) ‘Will Chinese Development Projects Pave the Way to Inclusive 
Growth?’, Brookings Blog, 11 September, 
   
 
 100 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/09/11/will-chinese-
development-projects-pave-the-way-to-inclusive-growth/ (accessed 12 March 
2020) 
Perera, A. (2018) ‘Fears Grow Over Chinese Projects in Sri Lanka’, China Dialogue, 12 
May, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10954-Fears-grow-
over-Chinese-projects-in-Sri-Lanka (accessed 12 February 2020) 
Pilling, D. and Klasa, A. (2017) ‘Kenya President Urges Rebalance of China-Africa 
Trade’, Financial Times, 14 May, https://www.ft.com/content/947ea960-38b2-
11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23 (3 March 2020) 
Pompeo, M.R. (2019) ‘On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement’, US Department 
of State, 4 November, https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-
agreement/ (accessed 10 March 2020) 
PSCU (2019) ‘Kenya Signs Agreement to Export Avocados to China’, The East African, 25 
April, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenyan-avocados-cleared-for-
China-market/2560-5087764-4fbuijz/index.html (accessed 29 February 2020) 
Qianhui, Z. (2015) ‘Snapshot of China-UK relations’, China Daily, 13 
October, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisituk/2015-
10/13/content_22174891_5.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Rajapaksa, G. (2019) ‘Gotabaya Presents to You a Reconstructed Country with a 
Future: Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour’, Gotabaya, https://gota.lk/sri-lanka-
podujana-peramuna-manifesto-english.pdf (accessed 10 February 2020) 
Rajapaksa, G. (2020) ‘The Policy Statement Made by His Excellency Gotabaya Rajapaksa, 
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka at the inauguration of 
the Fourth Session of the 8th Parliament of Sri Lanka’, Permanent Mission of Sri 
Lanka to the UN, 3 January, https://www.un.int/srilanka/news/policy-statement-
made-his-excellency-gotabaya-rajapaksa-president-democratic-socialist-republic 
(accessed 16 February 2020) 
Ratnapalan, L.M. (2016) ‘Britain and the Politics of Ceylon, 1948–1961’, The Historical 
Journal 59.2: 541–565, http://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X15000151 (accessed 10 
February 2020) 
Razzaque, M; Vickers, B. and Goel, P. (2016) Commonwealth Trade Policy Briefing: 
Brexit and Commonwealth Trade, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 
https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-
items/documents/BrexitandCommonwealthTrade.pdf (accessed 13 March 2020) 
Renwick, N.; Gu, J. and Gong, S. (2018) ‘The Impact of BRI Investment in Infrastructure 
on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals’, K4D Emerging Issues Report, 
Brighton: IDS 
   
 
 101 
Rohwerder, B. (2015) Conflict Analysis of Kenya. Birmingham: GSDRC, University 
of Birmingham 
 
Ross, A. (2017) ‘UK Condemned Over ‘Shocking’ Export of Deadly Weedkiller to Poorer 
Countries’, The Guardian, 22 August, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/aug/22/uk-condemned-shocking-export-deadly-weedkiller-
poorer-countries-paraquat (accessed 29 February 2020) 
UK-China Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network (2014) The 2nd Africa-Britain-China 
(ABC) Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries held in Beijing, Yangling: UK-CHina 
Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network (SAIN), http://www.sainonline.org/SAIN-
website(English)/pages/News/The%202nd%20Africa-Britain-
China%20(ABC)%20Conference%20on%20Agriculture%20and%20Fisheries%20he
l d%20in%20Beijing.html (3 March 2020) 
SAJOREC (2017) About, http://www.sinafrica.cas.cn/English/About/Introduction/ (accessed 
9 March 2020) 
Santander (2019) Sri Lanka: Foreign Investment, 
https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/sri-
lanka/investing-3 (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Savelli, E.; Schwartz, K. and Ahlers, R. (2018) ‘The Dutch Aid and Trade Policy: Policy 
Discourses Versus Development Practices in the Kenyan Water and Sanitation 
Sector’, Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 37.6: 1126-1147, 
doi:10.1177/0263774X18803364 (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Sheng, Z. (2019) ‘BRI helps Participating Countries with Technological Innovation’, 
People’s Daily, 26 April, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0426/c90000-9572518.html 
(accessed 3 March) 
Shepard, W. (2016) ‘The Story Behind the World’s Emptiest International Airport’, 
Forbes, 28 May, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/05/28/the-
story-behind-the- worlds-emptiest-international-airport-sri-lankas-mattala-
rajapaksa/ (accessed 12 February 2020) 
Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development (2019) ‘Carbon-Neutral Tea Value 
Chains –Germany China and the FAO Join Forces with Kenya’, Sino-German Center 
for Sustainable Development, 28 March, https://sg-csd.org/news_events/20190328/ 
(accessed 8 March 2020) 
Sirisena, R. (2015) ‘A Compassionate Maithri: Governance: A Stable Country’, Manifesto, 
Battaramulla: New Democratic Front, 
https://www.mfa.gov.lk/images/stories/pdf/manifesto-english.pdf (accessed 12 March 
2020) 
   
 
 102 
 
Sri Lanka Export Development Board (2018) ‘Exports to China Gets Major Boost’, Daily 
Mirror, 6 November, https://www.srilankabusiness.com/news/exports-to-china-gets-
major-boost.html (accessed 8 March 2020) 
Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (2018) Annual Statistical Report 
2018, SLTDA, http://www.sltda.lk/node/763 (accessed 12 February 
2020) 
Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (2019) Making Sri Lanka Tourism 
Sustainable, Colombo: Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority, 
http://www.sltda.lk/sustainable-tourism (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Steele, P. et al. (2019) Darwin Initiative Main and Post Project Annual Report, 
London: Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 
https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G04412.pdf (accessed 15 February 2020) 
Suokas, J. (2018) ‘Chinese State Enterprises Undertake over 3,100 Belt and Road 
Projects’, GB Times, 31 October, https://gbtimes.com/chinese-state-enterprises-
undertake-over-3100-belt-and-road-projects (accessed 9 March 2020) 
The Associated Press (2020) ‘UN Rights Chief Regrets Sri Lankan Withdrawal 
From Resolution’, The New York Times, 27 February, 
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/02/27/world/asia/ap-as-sri-
lanka-un.html (accessed 3 March 2020) 
The Embassy of Sri Lanka in the People’s Republic of China (2019) Sri Lanka China 
Trade Relations, Beijing: The Embassy of Sri Lanka in the People’s Republic of 
China, http://www.slemb.com/third.php?menu_code=38&lang=en (accessed 13 
February 2020) 
The National Treasury and Planning Kenya (2018) Third Medium Term Plan 2018-2022 
Transforming Lives: Advancing Socio-Economic Development Through the “Big 
Four”, Nairobi: The National Treasury and Planning, https://planning.go.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/THIRD-MEDIUM-TERM-PLAN-2018-2022.pdf (accessed 31 
January 2020) 
The State Council (2015) Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing: The State 
Council, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_2814750 
80249035.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2011) China’s Foreign Aid, Beijing: 
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_2814749862846
2 0.htm (accessed 29 February 2020) 
   
 
 103 
 
The Straits Times (2019) ‘Sri Lanka President Rajapaksa Warns India, West 
Investment Needed to Keep China at Bay’, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka-president-rajapaksa-
warns-india-west-investment-needed-to-keep-china-at (accessed 10 March 
2020) 
Trading Economics (2018) ‘Kenya imports China’, Trading Economics, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/imports/china (accessed 10 January 2020) 
Trading Economics (2020) ‘Kenya GDP Annual Growth Rate’, Trading Economics, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/gdp-growth-annual (accessed 10 January 
2020) 
UK Government (2011) Memorandum of Understanding for Partnership to Enhance 
Development Cooperation and the Achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals between Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the People’s Republic of China 
and DFID of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, London: 
Department for International Development, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
m ent_data/file/197473/China-UK-MOU-Signed-Version.pdf (accessed 12 February 
2020) 
UK Government (2015) UK-China Joint Statement 2015, London: Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-
statement-2015 (accessed 12 February 2020) 
UK Government (2016) UK-China Infrastructure Academy Opens its Doors and 
Welcomes First Students, London: Department for International Trade, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-infrastructure-academy-opens-its-
doors-and-welcomes-first-students (accessed 13 February 2020) 
UK Government (2018) Ambitious New Innovations Partnerships with African Countries, 
29 August, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ambitious-new-innovation-
partnerships-with-african-countries (accessed 3 March 2020) 
UK Government (2019) Guidance DCMS International Tech Hub Network, London: 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/dcms-
international-tech-hub-network (accessed 11 February 2020) 
UK Government (2020a) Alok Sharma heralds green cities of the future on Kenya visit, 
London: Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Alok Sharma 
MP, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/alok-sharma-heralds-green-cities-of-
the-future-on-kenya-visit (accessed 10 February 2020) 
   
 
 104 
UK Government (2020b) ‘UK Government Statement’, UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020, 
20 January, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/859314/2020_01_20_AIS_-_UK_Government_Statement_-
_Final_Version.pdf (accessed 10 February 2020) 
UK Government (2020c) UK’s partnerships with Africa, London: Department for Internatinoal 
Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/uks-partnerships-with-africa (accessed 
10 February 2020) 
UK Government (2020d) UK-Kenya Strategic Partnership 2020 to 2025: Joint Statement, 
London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing 
Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-
kenya-strategic-partnership-2020-2025 (accessed 10 February 2020) 
UK Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (2019) Policy 
Outcomes of the 10th UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
m ent_data/file/809569/190617_FINAL_POP_v2__002_.pdf (accessed 10 February 
2020) 
UN (2015) SDGs : Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, New York, NY: 
United Nations, sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs (accessed 31 January 
2020) 
UNCTAD (2019) World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones, Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf (accessed 10 February 
2020) 
UNCTAD (n.d.a) UNCTAD South-South Integration and the SDGs, Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/GDS/Economic%20Cooperation%20and%20Integration
%20among%20Developing%20Countries/2030Agenda-South-South-Integration-and-
the-SDGs.aspx (accessed 13 February 2020) 
UNCTAD (n.d.b) UNCTADstat, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html (accessed 6 January 
2020) 
UNDP (2016) Trilateral Cooperation with China, New York, NY: United Nations Development 
Programme, https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-
   
 
 105 
relations/Discussion%20Paper_Trilateral%20Cooperation%20with%20China.pdf 
(accessed 13 February 2020) 
 
UNDP (2018) Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update Briefing 
Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update: Kenya, New York, NY: United 
Nations Development Programme, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdrtheme/country-notes/KEN.pdf (accessed 10 
January 2020) 
UNDP (2019) ‘Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century’, Human 
Development Report 2019, New York, NY: United Nations Development 
Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/KEN.pdf 
(accessed 24 January 2020) 
UNDP China (2020) MOFCOM-UNDP: Trilateral Cooperation on Renewable Energy in 
Sri Lanka, Beijing: United Nations Development Programme, 
https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/projects/mofcom-undp--trilateral-
cooperation-on-renewable-energy-in-sri-l.html (accessed 10 March 2020) 
UNDP Ethiopia (2019) Promoting South-South Cooperation in Renewable Energy: Ethiopia, 
Sri Lanka and China, Addis Ababa: United Nations Development Programme, 
https://www.et.undp.org/content/ethiopia/en/home/presscenter/articles/2019/04/pro
m oting-south-south-cooperation-in-renewable-energy--ethiopia-.html (accessed 10 
March 2020) 
UNHCR Kenya (2020) KENYA Registered Refugees and Asylum-seekers, Statistics based 
on UNHCR’s Refugee Registration System, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2020/02/Kenya-Infographics-31-January-2020.pdf (accessed 
16 February 2020) 
Venugopal, R. (2018) Nationalism, Development and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:0.1017/9781108553414 (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Wang, Z. and Ye, F. (2019) ‘China–Sri Lanka Relations in the Context of the 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road: Motives, Challenges, and Prospects’, Asian 
Perspective 43.3: 481–503, http://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0020 (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
Ward, M. (2020) Statistics on UK Trade with the Commonwealth, London: House of 
Commons Library, 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8282/CBP-
8282.pdf (accessed 14 February 2020) 
   
 
 106 
Weerakoon, D.; Kumar, U. and Dime, R. (2019) ‘Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges: a 
Tale of Two Deficits’, ADB South Asia Working Paper Series 63, Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/493451/swp-
063-sri-lanka-macroeconomic-challenges-two-deficits.pdf (accessed 12 March 2020) 
 
Were, A. (2019) ‘Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa’s Development Options’, 
South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Insight 66, 
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/debt-trap-chinese-loans-and-africas-
development-options/ (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Wheeler, T. et al. (2012) China and Conflict-Affected States: Between Principle and 
Pragmatism, London: Saferworld, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08aad40f0b649740006f2/China-
and-conflict-affected-states.pdf (accessed 10 January 2020) 
White and Case (2018) Belt & Road in Africa, New York, NY: White and Case, 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/belt-and-road-africa (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
Wijayasiri J. and Senaratne, N. (2018) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Sri 
Lanka’, in A. García (ed), China: BRI o el Nuevo Camino de la Seda, Mexico 
City: National Autonomous University of Mexico, 
https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/12/5550/19.pdf (accessed 15 
February 2020) 
Wijayasiri, J.; Perera, N.; Jayaratne, S. and Premaratne, D. (2014) Study on China-Sri 
Lanka Free Trade Agreement, Colombo: The Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka 
(IPS), http://www.ips.lk/study-on-china-sri-lanka-free-trade-agreement/ (accessed 9 
February 2020) 
Wild, L. and Elhawary, S. (2012) The UK’s Approach to Linking Development and 
Security: Assessing Policy and Practice, London: Overseas Development Institute, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/7658.pdf (accessed 8 March 2020) 
Wilton Park (2016) ‘Report: Improving the Impact of Development Projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Through Increased UK/Brazil Cooperation and Partnerships’, Improving the 
Impact of Development Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa Through Increased UK/Brazil 
Cooperation and Partnerships event, 17-18 November, Brasilia: Wilton Park, 
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1492-Report.pdf (accessed 10 
March 2020) 
   
 
 107 
Workman, D. (2020) ‘Top Pesticides Exporters’, World’s Top Exports, 14 January, 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-pesticides-exporters/ (Accessed 29 February 
2020) 
World Bank (2003) Appendix 1: The Root Causes of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Washington 
DC: World Bank 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSRILANKA/Resources/App1.pdf (accessed 14 
February 2020) 
World Bank (2009) Project Information Document (PID) Concept Stage, Washington DC: 
World Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/753881468103455835/pdf/PI 
D010from0EM01010saved0July0702009.pdf (accessed 13 February 2020) 
World Bank (2015) Doing Business 2015, Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual
-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
World Bank (2017) World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS): Kenya at a Glance, 
Washington DC: World Bank, https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en 
(accessed 10 January 2020) 
World Bank (2018a) Kenya Charts Path to Achieving Universal Access to Electricity, 
Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/12/06/kenya-charts-path-to-
achieving-universal-access-to-electricity (accessed 10 January 2020) 
World Bank (2018b) Kenya Economic Update – In Search of Fiscal Space 
Government Spending and Taxation: Who Benefits?, Washington DC: World 
Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/766271538749794576/pdf/Kenya-
Economic-Update-18-FINAL.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
World Bank (2019a) Overview: the World Bank in Kenya, Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview (accessed 10 January 
2020) 
World Bank (2019b) Country Overview Sri Lanka, Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/overview (accessed 14 
February 2020) 
World Bank (2020a) Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate) 
Kenya, Washington DC: World Bank, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=KE (accessed 14 
February 2020) 
   
 
 108 
World Bank (2020b) Doing Business 2020, Washington DC: World Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-
Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies.pdf (accessed 3 
March 2020) 
World Bank Data (2018) Kenya Human Capital Index Rank 94 out of 157, Washington DC: 
World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/hci/HCI_2pager_KEN.pdf 
(accessed 14 February 2020) 
World Bank Group (2020) Economy Profile: Sri Lanka: Doing Business 2020, Washington 
DC: World Bank, 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sri-
lanka/LKA.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020) 
World Nuclear News (2017) ‘China's CGN extends its cooperation with Kenya’, 23 
March, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Chinas-CGN-extends-its-
cooperation-with-Kenya-2303174.html (accessed 9 March 2020) 
World Population Review (2020) GDP Ranked by Country 2020, Walnut: World 
Population Review, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-gdp/ 
(accessed 8 March 2020) 
World Trade Organization (n.d.) Aid for Trade, Geneva: World Trade Organization, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (accessed 
9 March 2020) 
Worley, W. (2020) ‘DFID Country Directors Told to Report to the Foreign Office’, Devex, 
6 March, https://www.devex.com/news/dfid-country-directors-told-to-report-to-the-
foreign-office-96704 (accessed 10 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2004) ‘China, Kenya Sign Tourism MOU’, 17 March, 
http://german.china.org.cn/english/travel/90585.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2015) ‘Full text: Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative’, 30 March, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_2814750802490
3 5.htm (accessed 14 February 2020) 
Xinhua (2017) ‘Chinese Delegation in Kenya to Look for Investment Opportunities’, 17 June, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-06/17/content_29782052.htm (accessed 
10 January 2020) 
Xinhua (2018a) ‘Kenya, China sign MOU to Promote Cooperation in Science, Innovation’, 
Xinhua, 14 December, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
12/14/c_137674788.htm (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2018b) ‘Chinese Firms in Kenya Create 50,000 Jobs in 2018: Report’, Xinhua, 
15 December, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/15/c_137676947.htm 
(accessed 3 March 2020)
   
 
 109 
Xinhua (2018c) ‘Kenyan Beneficiaries of Scholarships from Chinese Firm to Study 
Railway Technology in Beijing’, 20 April, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
04/20/c_137125766.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2019a) ‘China Focus: Belt and Road Development on High-Quality Path as 
Second Forum Closes’, 27 April,  http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
04/27/c_138016180.htm (accessed 3 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2019b) ‘China, Kenya Relations Have Developed with Deep Roots: Chinese Envoy’, 
23 May, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/23/c_138083587.htm (accessed 
3 March 2020) 
Xinhua (2019c) ‘Interview: Sri Lanka to Promote Tourism in China to Attract More 
Chinese Visitors’, March 13, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
03/13/c_137892526.htm (accessed 16 February 2020) 
Zhihao, Z (2019) ‘BRI prompts closer global scientific cooperation’, China Daily, 29 April, 
https://enapp.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/29/AP5cc64035a3104dbcdfaa7909.html?fr 
om=timeline (accessed 9 March 2020) 
Zhou, H. (2018) ‘China-Britain-Uganda: Trilateral Development Cooperation in Agriculture’, 
China Africa Research Initiative Working Paper No. 2018/20, Washington DC: China 
Africa Research Initiative, http://www.sais-cari.org/publications (accessed 10 March 
2020) 
 
 
